#5097 - House Of Spring Gardens V. Waite - Conflict of Laws BCL

House of Spring Gardens v. Waite

Facts

The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against all three defendants in the Republic of Ireland for 3,474,570 and interest of 78,337. That was a judgment given by Costello J. initially on 20 December 1982, when he determined the question of liability in favour of the plaintiffs, and on 7 March and 27 April 1983, when he assessed damages in their favour. An appeal by the three defendants to the Supreme Court of Ireland was dismissed with costs on 11 January 1985, save that the amount of interest was, to a small extent, reduced.

The purpose of the present proceedings in this country is to enforce the judgment of Costello J. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 does not apply to that judgment. The answer put forward by the defendants in these proceedings is that the judgment of Costello J. was obtained by fraud, namely misrepresentation as to the plaintiffs' entitlement to the confidential information and copyright in issue in the action.

Re-trial specifically on the point of fraud: On 21 March 1985 the plaintiffs issued the writ in this action, seeking to enforce the judgment of Costello J. Defences were filed on behalf of all three defendants claiming that his judgment had been obtained by fraud. The matters relied upon were the allegations of Mr. Parish. This claim was dismissed by the Court.

Holding

It is common ground that in proceedings in this country to enforce a foreign judgment as a debt at common law, the defendant can set up a defence that the judgment was obtained by fraud…. But a foreign judgment that is final and conclusive on its merits and is not impeachable on the ground of fraud (or other grounds that are not material) is conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon and cannot be impeached for any error of fact or law… But for the judgment of Egan J., Costello J.'s judgment could have been impeached on the ground of fraud. But the plaintiffs contend that the judgment of Egan J. is final and conclusive on the issue whether or not the prior judgment was obtained by fraud, and cannot itself be impeached… This is because the foreign judgment can be impeached for fraud even though no newly discovered fraud is relied upon and the fraud might have been, and was, relied upon in the foreign proceedings: see Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co. (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 295 and Vadala v. Lawes (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 310.

Effect of a separate trial on the question of fraud: These cases have been considerably criticised over the years; they were decided at a time when our courts paid scant regard to the jurisprudence of other countries. Nevertheless, we are bound by them and they were recently followed in this court in Jet Holdings Inc. v. Patel [1990] 1 Q.B. 335. But in my judgment the scope of these decisions should not be extended, and they are clearly distinguishable. In none of these cases was the question, whether the judgment sued upon here was obtained by fraud, litigated in a separate and second action in the foreign jurisdiction. Unless Egan J.'s decision is itself impeached for fraud, it is conclusive of the matter thereby adjudicated upon, namely, whether Costello J.'s judgment was obtained by fraud: see Dicey & Morris, rule 42.

Estoppel Justification

The answer is that no question of fraud on the part of Mr. Sacks was in issue in the Costello action; it was in the Egan action. I have no doubt that the judge was correct to hold, on the material and argument before him, that the Waites were estopped from alleging that the judgment of Costello J. was obtained by fraud, based, as that allegation was, on the evidence of Mr. Parish and Mr. Waldie. I propose to consider later in this judgment the effect of Colonel Piper's evidence.

Abuse of Process Justification

But I have no doubt whatever that, even if the judgment of Egan J. did not create an estoppel, it would be an abuse of process for the Waites to re-litigate the very same issue in the English courts upon which they failed in Ireland, not least because they themselves chose that forum, which was the natural forum in which to challenge the judgment of Costello J. They could, if they had wished, merely have waited for enforcement proceedings to be taken here and then attempt to set up fraud. They did not do so. They cannot try again here to obtain a different verdict.

The principle has recently been applied in this court to analogous cases, where issues of fact have been litigated exhaustively in sample cases; it is an abuse of process for a litigant, who was not one of the sample cases, to re-litigate all the issues of fact on the same or substantially the same evidence: see Ashmore v. British Coal Corporation [1990] 2 Q.B. 338.

The question is whether it would be in the interests of justice and public policy to allow the issue of fraud to be litigated again in this court, it having been tried and determined by Egan J. in Ireland. In my judgment it would not; indeed, I think it would be a travesty of justice. Not only would the plaintiffs be required to...