#6766 - Williams V. Bayley - Restitution of Unjust Enrichment BCL

Williams v. Bayley

Facts

On Friday the 17th of April, 1863, the father being at a railway station, and circumstances having arisen which caused these bankers to have doubts about the signatures to certain bills or promissory notes, and the bankers wishing to satisfy themselves whether a signature was, as it purported to be, that of the father, James Bayley, they presented to him a note for 500 made by the son, and purporting to contain the father's signature, and asked him whether that was his signature. The father denied it. The bank manager, who was present, was much surprised to find that the signature was not correct, and it was arranged that the matter should be looked into, that it should stand over then, and that there should be another meeting with the parties on the following day. It appears that, in the course of the evening of that day, the son, William Bayley, was communicated with. He was informed of what had taken place; and, I suppose, the conclusion was come to in the family that the son had been in the habit of using his father's name without his sanction. I say "using his father's name without his sanction," for I have no doubt at all in coming to the conclusion (there is not a tittle of evidence to the contrary) that all these signatures were forgeries. That they were not the signatures of the father is clear, and I do not think there is the smallest reason to suppose that he ever gave his son any express or implied authority to sign the bills in his name.

One member of the family, Thomas Abishai Bayley (another son of the Respondent and brother of William), who is not at all involved in these transactions, went with his father to the bank, and then considerable negotiation took place. It is obvious that at that time the bankers must have seen that they were in great jeopardy as to the notes, and that they would probably lose their money unless the father came in and assisted the son. I cannot, however, but come to the conclusion, from the evidence, that they strongly suspected, indeed they must be said to have known, that these signatures were forgeries. If the signatures were forgeries, then the bankers were in this position, that they had the means of prosecuting the son.

When the parties met on Saturday, there was a very significant expression made use of by Mr. Deakin, the manager, in the presence of one of the bankers, Henry Williams, "We do not wish to exercise pressure on you if it can be satisfactorily arranged."… The "pressure" there referred to must be something different from merely obtaining the security of the father. It amounts to this: "Take your choice - give us security for your son's debt. If you take that on yourself, then it will all go smoothly; if you do not, we shall be bound to exercise pressure;" which could only mean, to exercise those rights which remain to us, by reason of our holding signatures forged by your son.

The father said something about the son paying the bankers by instalments of 1000 a-year. To which one of the bankers answered, "We shall have nothing to do with any 1000 a-year. If the bills are yours" (addressing the Plaintiff) "we are all right. If they are not, we have only one course to pursue; we cannot be parties to compounding a felony." Now, according to my interpretation of the law, it does not amount to compounding a felony. But one sees clearly what the parties meant. It was this: If you choose to take on yourself the responsibility of these bills, all will be right; but if not, we cannot be parties to what they call "compounding a felony;" but what Lord Ellenborough more correctly called "stifling a prosecution."

The solicitor of the bankers said, "Yes, it is a serious matter," and Mr. Duignan remarked, "it is a case of transportation for life." Now that was said in the hearing of the bankers. They must have heard it. They must have known, while all these negotiations were going on, that all the parties to them understood that this was a case, not of life or death, but of transportation for life. The father, then, was acting in this matter under the notion that if he did not interfere to save his son, the latter would be liable to be prosecuted, and, probably, would be prosecuted for forgery, and so be transported for life.

Holding

Lord Cranworth

I am bound to go the length of saying that I do not think it is legal. I do not think that a transaction of that sort would have been legal even if, instead of being forced on the father, it had been proposed by him and adopted by the bankers; and I come to that conclusion upon this short ground, that in Wallace v. Hardacre (1), although the decision there, founded upon the facts of that particular case, was against the view I am taking, yet there Lord Ellenborough positively states that which has always been understood to be the correct view of the law upon this subject, namely, that although in that case there was no reason for treating the agreement as invalid, yet it would have been otherwise if the agreement had been substantially an agreement to stifle a criminal prosecution.

Now, is the agreement in question, or is it not, one the object of which is to stifle a criminal prosecution? If there be any case in which that character can be properly given to an agreement I think that this is such a case, and therefore, in my opinion, the decree is perfectly right.

Lord Chelmsford

I agree with my noble and learned friend on the woolsack, that the object of the arrangement between the parties was to save William Bayley from a prosecution for forgery; and I make that the foundation of the opinion which I have formed with regard to the agreement having been extorted from the father by undue pressure. It appears to me to be quite clear that the negotiations between the parties proceeded upon the footing of forgery having been committed by William Bayley, and of his being liable to a criminal prosecution; and that the bankers, both personally, and by means of their agents, Mr. Thursfield, their solicitor and Mr. Deakin their manager, availed themselves of the fears of the father for the safety of his son, to press the arrangement upon him.

Therefore they place their defence entirely upon those two grounds. That there was no compounding of felony, even if a felony had been committed; and that there was no force used, no undue influence exerted on the Plaintiff, who acted throughout on the advice of his solicitor.

Then the defence of the bankers being rested entirely on these two grounds, as I have already said, in my opinion, this negotiation proceeded upon an understanding between the parties that the agreement of James Bayley, to give security for the notes, would relieve William Bayley from the consequences of his criminal act; and the fears of the father were stimulated and operated on to an extent to deprive him of free agency, and to extort an agreement from him for the benefit of the bankers. It appears to me, therefore, that the case comes within the principles on which a Court of equity proceeds in setting aside an agreement where there is inequality between the parties, and one of them takes unfair advantage of the situation of the other, and uses undue influence to force an agreement from him.

Lord Westbury

My Lords, there are two aspects of this case, or rather two points of view, in which it many be regarded. One of them is; was the Plaintiff a free and voluntary agent, or did he give the security in question under undue pressure exerted by the Defendants? That regards the case with respect to the Plaintiff alone. The second question regards the case with reference to the Defendants alone. Was the transaction, taken independently of the question of pressure, an illegal one, as being contrary to the settled rules and principles of law?

Is the agreement vitiated by duress?

It was skilfully contended on the part of the Appellants, by the learned Counsel, that the basis of the transaction was either the actual or the possible liability of the father to the debt. But that is an argument wholly unsupported by the evidence; and, on the...