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#13545 - Summary Judgment Skeleton Argument - BPC Civil Advocacy

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IN THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT Claim No. CL14/2432

CHANCERY BUSINESS

BETWEEN:

MR THOMAS JARNDYCE
(Executor of the estate of the late
MR PETER ALBERT DAVIDSON) Applicant/Claimant

and

MRS PATRICIA MARTINE EMMERSON Respondent/Defendant

SKELETON ARGUMENT OF THE APPLICANT



Introduction:

  1. This is C’s application, under CPR, r.24.2, for summary judgment in an estate dispute. C says that D has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and that there is no other compelling reason why the case should go to trial.

    The Relevant Facts:

  2. The Applicant, Mr. Thomas Jarndyce was appointed as executor under the final Will of the late Mr. Peter Davidson. The final Will states that he leaves the bulk of his estates to the Marie Curie Cancer Care Trust, a registered charity and nothing to the Respondent, Mrs Emmerson.

  3. At the time of the Mr. Davidson’s death, his estate included a man’s platinum dress ring containing one large and 5 small sapphires, a man’s gold signet ring with a black onyx inset and a lady’s white gold ring set with a large solitaire diamond. The estate also included cash to the sum of 805.73. These were found on Mr. Davidson’s possession on the hospital were he was declared dead.

  4. After Mr. Davidson’s death, the Respondent entered the hospital and took possession of the 3 rings and the cash. She was allowed in his room as she falsely said she was Mr. Davidson’s cousin.

  5. The Respondent says that she is entitled to these goods as Mr. Davidson promised her the rings, and in particular the 2 rings to her sons and the diamond ring to herself, as she states they were planning to get married. The Respondent also says that Mr. Davidson promised her the cash.

  6. The Applicant says that she is not entitled to these goods in any way. The present position is that the Respondent refuses to return, and remains in possession of the 3 rings and the cash.

    The Issues:

  7. Whether under CPR, r.24.2:

    1. D has a real prospect of defending the claim on the basis that Mr. Davidson promised the 2 rings to the Respondent’s children, and promised the diamond ring to the Respondent as their engagement ring and promised the cash to the Respondent;

    2. There is any other compelling reason for there to be a trial.

The Law:

  1. Section 1 Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (TIGA) defines wrongful interference with goods as conversion of goods (also called trover).

  2. Section 3(1) TIGA 1977 states that in proceedings for wrongful interference against a person who is in possession or in control of the goods relief may be given in accordance with this section, so far as appropriate.

  3. Section 3(2) states that the relief is either:

    1. An order for delivery of the goods, and for payment of any consequential damages, or

    2. An order for delivery of the goods, but giving the defendant the alternative of paying damages by reference to the value of the goods, together in either alternative with payment of any consequential damages, or

    3. Damages.

  4. Section 4(2) TIGA 1977 gives the court the power to make an order providing for the delivery up of any goods which are the subject matter of subsequent proceedings in the court, or as to which any question may arise in proceedings.

  5. The rule in Milroy v Lord [1862] EWHC J78 states that equity will not perfect a transfer that has not met the necessary formal constitution requirements. In addition pursuant to the case of Richards v Delbridge [1874] LR 18 Eq 11, equity will not perfect an imperfect gift. However there are exceptions to this rule:

    1. The rule in Strong v Bird [1874] LR 18 Eq 315. This rule applies to gifts where

      1. The donor intends to make an immediate gift,

      2. The donor’s intention remains unchanged until his death, and

      3. The done obtains the legal title as the executor or as administrator.

    2. Donatio Mortis Causa. According to the case of Cain v Moon [1896] 2 Q.B. 283, a gift in contemplation of death will be valid if it is:

      1. Made in contemplation of imminent death;

      2. Conditional on the donor’s death, and

      3. The donor makes actual or constructive delivery of the property to the donee.

  6. According to the case of Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 KB 169 (a set of antique chairs, while expensive and difficult to otherwise obtain, were not sufficiently unique) states that ‘ordinary articles of commerce’ are not sufficiently unique. There are exceptions however, like the case of Falcke v Gray [1859] 62 Eng. Rep. 250, that where the goods display ‘unusual beauty, rarity and distinction are sufficiently unique.

    Submissions:

  7. The Respondent has converted the items within the meaning of section 1 of the Torts (Interference with Goods Act) 1977. The Respondent has wrongfully interfered with the goods and therefore an order for delivery of goods and payment of any consequential damages should be made under section 3(2)(a) of Torts (Interference with Goods Act) 1977.

    Content of the Will

  8. The Will is silent on the rings and cash.

    1. The final Will was made on the 13th November 2010, leaving Mr Davidson’s bulk estate to the Marie Curie Cancer Trust, a registered charity (TJ WS, para 1, p.18).

    2. Mr Davidson was specifically asked by the executor if he wanted to leave anything to the Mrs Emmerson (TJ WS, para 5, p.19).

    3. Mr. Davidson expressed his wish to leave one ring to his doctor and the other to the son of his former gardener (TJ WS, para 7, p.20).

    4. Mrs Emmerson says that these rings were destined for her 2 sons, however Mr. Davidson did not like them (PE WS, para 8, p. 32, PE WS para 5, p.31)

    5. Mrs Emmerson lack credibility as she needs to rings the rings to fund herself (TJ WA para 21, p. 24), whereas the executor lacks motive.

The alleged marriage is spurious

  1. There were no plans for marriage and therefore Mrs Emmerson is not entitled to the diamond ring

    1. The reason Mrs Emmerson moved in was because she was desperate (TJ WS, para. 7, p. 20)

    2. Mr. Davidson was not invited to parties (TJ WS, para 9, p. 20)

    3. Mrs Emmerson’s behavior post Mr. Davidson’s death shows...

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