#17373 - Complicity Notes - Criminal law

• D1 and D2 commit the AR of the offence together with the required MR.

• Primary parties committing the offence- Example A: By coincidence, P and S independently attack V, who dies from the cumulative effect of the blows. They are both principals in the murder of V.

• 2 people’s separate actions cumulatively cause the death of V. Example B: Several different people required to commit the offence- P1, P2, and P3 work together to forge banknotes. P1 sources the special cotton paper used in banknotes, P2 gets the special ink used, and P3 handles the actual printing. Though none of them individually performs the entire actus reus of forgery, each of them contributes to the performance of the actus reus, with the shared intent to commit the offence of forgery. Each is a principal to forgery.

• All contributed significantly to the actus reus of the offence. Direct causal links to the act.

D uses an innocent party (X) to commit an offence , where X lacks mens rea .

Though the free and voluntary act of a 3rd party breaks the chain of causation: Where the innocent party has been uninformed, there can be no free and voluntary act to break the chain of causation.

Principle of the innocent agent works by creating a legal fiction whereby the person is treated as a mere implement.

Innocent agency only applies if the person intends to use them as a tool/ mere implement. Example: A says to B take the keys to the car and B thinks it is A’s car but A’s intention if for B to help him steal the car. Innocent agency principle will not apply as A didn’t intend to use B as an innocent agent but a co-conspirator.

• May still lack the mens rea for a criminal offence and thus not be liable

R v Michael (1840) – woman gave up child for foster care, wanted to kill child – gave foster mother bottle of something she said was medicine – foster mother’s child saw bottle and administered it to foster child, killing the child – S (the child administering) was an innocent agent and thus not liable – mother was the principal agent in the murder of her child.

R v Cogan & Leak [1976] QB 217- Pre SOA case therefore only need for genuine belief in consent and a husband could not rape his wife.

Courts said ideally would want to apply the innocent agency doctrine as Cogan lacks the mens rea plus Leak intended to use him as his tool but couldn’t do it due to procedural reasons.

Convicted Leak as an accessory by way of procuring the actus reus of an offence. Therefore convoluted rule that you can be an accessory to a non-crime. = double fiction. (Should rarely make legal fictions but lecturer thinks in this case= reasonable to do so or at least desirable.)

Critics say= artificial to think of D conducting an act through the innocent agent of someone else.

Textbooks and Mark disagree.

4 ways that you could be involved in an offence.

• Principals in the first degree; the one who does the offence.,

• Principals in the second degree; person is present during the crime and helped the perpetrator.

• Accessories before the fact; Someone who helps in advance. Not present during act.

• Accessories after the fact; helping after the crime is done i.e. hiding the murderer.

Initially, separate treatment and separate convictions, but over time, common law evolved in a piecemeal fashion to allow accessories to be tried and sentenced as principals in some cases.

The same rule is extended to summary offences as well (not just indictable offences, all offences basically.)

Good because: If don’t know who the Principal and accessory are then doesn’t matter as liable for the same charge and punishment. R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1- Either hired a hitman or killed his wife himself, unknown. Convicted of murder either way.

Kennedy = responsible for actions you take but accessory liability suggests otherwise as liable for actions you didn’t take.

Lecturer- primary reason for holding secondary party for an offence directly perpetrated by the Principal(P) is that they’ve done something that has some influence on P’s crime and have chosen to associate themselves with P’s crime.

BTW: Can be an accessory even just by being a watchman for the crime or a getaway driver as made it more likely that the crime would have been executed successfully. Degree of influence therefore not that high. That autonomous choice to influence and associate yourself with the crime is blameworthy.

Seems like low threshold as why convicted even though didn’t act/ do anything: Encourages them to take the risk of committing the crime therefore knowingly and actively playing a role even though minimal.

Liability of accessory depends on that of the principal. Starting position is that an accessory is guilty of the same offence as the principal.

• This prima facie position can be displaced if there is a reason to deviate from it.

R v Bryce (2004) - drug dealer, G ordered Bryce to drive V to his house - Bryce would drive V to the house, P would kill him - Bryce tried to delay this plan, drove V somewhere else - Bryce drove P to the caravan to assess the situation and then murder V at a later time - G then told them they had to murder V now - issue was whether Bryce was an accessory in driving P to the caravan - was not keen on the crime happening but was willing to allow it, was unsure about going ahead but was equally unsure of backing out - the principal was convicted of murder and thus Bryce was as well.

‘’S must by doing what he does intend to assist or encourage rather than hinder or obstruct’’

R v A, B, C and D - C is the boss, orders A, B and D to beat up V - they did so, V died from the combined effects of the attack - initially all four were convicted of murder, A, B and D as principals and C as an accessory - on appeal the convictions of the principals were quashed as it could not be shown that any of them had intended to cause death or really serious harm - C wanted his conviction quashed as well, appealed - court agreed as his liability also derived from that of the principals, thus if their convictions were quashed it would follow that his would be too.

• The accessory can be convicted of a more serious offence than the principal.Depends on the mens rea states and defences available.

• One party may have a defence, does not preclude the conviction of the other

Principal can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter whilst the accessory is convicted of murder. Depending on the mens rea states and defences available. One party may have a defence, does not preclude the conviction of the other.

R v Richards [1974] QB 776-

• Defendant Richards hired hitmen to beat up her husband severely enough to put him in the hospital for a month. They assaulted the victim in an alley. The injuries were not as serious as anticipated and the victim did not require hospitalization.

• Richards charged under S.18 of OAPA whilst hitmen charged under S.20.

• The Queen's Bench quashed Richards' conviction on the basis that she could not be held criminally liable for a more serious offense when the more serious offense did not in fact occur.

• Reduced her conviction to s.20 conviction based on deriviative liability.

• Held that an accomplice to an assault cannot be convicted of a more serious offense than the principal even if the accomplice had the mens rea necessary for the more serious offense.

R v Howe [1987] 2 WLR 568- HOL said COA had gotten it wrong and shouldn’t have interfered with the trial courts ruling. Thus Richards = wrong as if the same level of harm can give rise to different offences based on the mens rea then makes sense to convict based on corresponding mens rea states then convict each person depending on their mens rea.

Homicide Act 1957, s2(4)

Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54(8)

R v Stewart and Schofield [1995] 1 Cr App R 441-

In an attempted robbery, Schofield kept watch, while Stewart and Lambert, both armed, went into the shop. Lambert beat the shopkeeper to death. S & S claimed not to have contemplated committing murder and that this only happened because L was a racist and the shopkeeper was black. The Jury convicted them of manslaughter and CA upheld convictions, saying that this was open to the jury since whether or not D2s contemplated a certain type of crime was a question of fact (NOT law). Where D2 had the mens rea for a lesser offence then he could be convicted of a lesser crime than D1 (Lambert was convicted of murder). I.e. where the act was within the scope of...