Industrial Economics I Notes
What is competition?
Competition in markets is generally considered a good thing (welfare economics)
Competition authorities look at whether change in market structure or firm behaviour can result in increase in welfare
Consider whether the existing one is the best potential one in terms of welfare perspective
Economists tend to look at total economic welfare: consumer surplus + producer surplus (profit)
In many competition investigations, focus is on consumer welfare
Consumer surplus = diff between consumer’s valuation of the good and the price she effectively pays for (area above price and below demand curve)
Producer surplus = sum of all profits made by producers in the industry (area below price and above marginal cost or supply curve)
Welfare is lowest when monopoly price and welfare is highest when P= MC
Must consider dynamic component of welfare, future welfare matters too. Ex. If firm knows that it cannot cover fixed cost, there is no innovation and future welfare is reduced at P = MC
Main issue is to not have producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus
Rivalry, entry, efficiency and innovation
Allocation, dynamic and productive efficiency
Allocative efficiency P= MC
Productive efficiency: Whether firms are producing at minimum cost given technology (any point on PPC is productive efficient but does not indicate other efficiencies)
Dynamic efficiency: Are new technologies developed?
Competition authorities may have broader perspectives such as consider impact on whole EU market, national security and economic growth ex. During Global Financial Crisis, banks are allowed to merge to be kept solvent. Take into acc the financial stability of the economy
Difficult to tell apart genuine competitive strategies from predatory ones
Perfect competition
Many consumers, none large relative to size of market
Many producers, none large relative to size of market
Price takers, cannot influence market price
No government intervention
Firms maximize profits and consumers maximize utility
No strategic interaction
Homogeneous products
Free entry and exit into industry and no barriers of entry and exit
All players have perfect information
Simultaneous moves
Firms cannot influence input price and output price and use MR=MC to decide on output
Short run market equilibrium is P = MC
Long run market equilibrium is P = LRAC
Zero economic profit
No entry or exit at long run eq
Industry supply = N (firm’s supply)
Allocative efficiency attained because P = MC
Technical efficiency attained because it operates at LRAC minimum cost
But no dynamic efficiency because firm earns zero economic profit in the long run, no incentive to innovate as no short term monopoly rent to earn, no profit to reinvest in the long run
In the short run maybe innovate to get minimum cost
Perfect competition provides stylized benchmark
But not realistic
Underpins competition policy because we hope firms can deliver outcomes as close to that of perfect competition
Used for wider policy options and welfare analysis
Monopoly
Monopoly is a sufficient but not necessary condition for competition problems
It is a very specific circumstance
Alternatively, we can consider competition as everything except monopoly but non-monopoly situations can also have competition concerns
Many consumers, none relative to size of market
ONE FIRM
No government intervention
Firm maximizes profits, consumers maximize utility
No strategic interaction
Unique product
No entry and exit of industry, high barriers to entry (other firms cannot access the technology at the same cost)
Monopolist may overinvest in capacity, carry out predatory pricing, foreclose access of rivals to crucial inputs, switching costs that cause incumbent firms to retain market power
All players have perfect information
Firm is price maker and consumers are price takers
Downward sloping demand curve and MR curve is below that
Allocative inefficiency because P > MC
Rent seeking
Productive inefficiency because of X inefficiency, monopoly does not seek to be at minimum cost, happy to be earning its high profits
Dynamic efficiency because short term monopoly rents encourage innovation but unlikely if no threat of entry
There is deadweight loss
Elasticity of demand determines the ability to price above marginal cost and hence deadweight loss area
Posner state that the social cost of monopoly is deadweight loss + monopoly’s rent
Firms use resources to become monopolies and protect monopoly position
Opportunity cost of resources not captured in the deadweight loss triangle
Firms invest up to potential rent of monopoly
Excess R&D spent to protect patent, spend to create barriers of entry, overinvest in capacity or lobbying expenses
Leibenstein states that monopoly likes a quiet life, can stay in business and earn profit without minimizing cost (X-inefficiency)
Monopoly is happy to live with high monopoly profit even if with more effort, they could get more. Empirical evidence has shown that monopoly may not want to put in effort to find new technologies even if they increase profit. No competitive pressure to minimize cost and if putting effort is costly for managers, they will not do so.
Monopoly may be least cost if natural monopoly
-upfront fixed costs are high
-average cost declines over the whole range of output
-marginal cost lies below average cost over the whole range of output
-least cost if have one firm producing rather than many firms
-depends on technology or cost characteristics of firms
Temporary monopoly profit is needed for innovation so it is not a cause of concern for competition
Potential to earn short term monopoly rent spur innovation and is good for dynamic efficiency (Justification for patents). Short term market power is a powerful incentive for firms to innovate and invest.
Basis for Austrian school of thought that competition is a dynamic process so it is okay to have potential short term monopoly rent with threat to entry
Austrian idea of creative destruction
-start with monopoly but potential entry so competitors see the profits and enter and erode monopoly profits
-get competitive equilibrium in the long run
-short term monopoly to deliver long term dynamic efficiency
Main concern comes when there is long term monopoly profits coupled with absence of innovation and barriers to entry
Effective competition, market power and dominance
Most markets sit in a spectrum between monopoly and perfect competition
Monopoly and perfect competition are only stylized extremes of the market
We want to focus if merger will result in SLC (substantial lessening of competition)
Competition act chapter 1 precludes agreements that prevent, restrict or distort competition
Competition act chapter 2 relate to abuse of dominant position by firm or groups of firms
Focus whether current market conditions have an adverse effect on competition
No clear definition of what effective competition means
Evidence of rivalry (but in perfect competition, there is no active firm rivalry yet there is allocative efficiency)
Absence of restraints on firm’s activities by other firms (firms have agreements with each other for production or improvement of efficiency but cartel is prohibited by law)
Horizontal agreements: agreements among competitors
Vertical agreements: agreements between firms at different stages of production (manufacturer and retailer)
No firm can influence market price (each firm will try to have some market power to influence price)
If we use perfect competition benchmark of pricing, majority of the markets would require investigation because nearly all markets have some form of P>MC
Effective competition is characterized by absence of market power
Market power is the ability to profitably priced above competitive price (MC) over a sustained period of time
Characteristics of market power include: restrict output, profitably increase price
Own price elasticity of demand, cross price elasticity of demand and price elasticity of supply
A firm with significant market power considered dominant in relevant market
Ability to prevent effective competition acting independently of competitors, customers and consumers
Competitive constraints from competitors or consumers are ineffective
Firm is free from competitive constraint
Rules of thumb measures of dominance as starting point for investigations
Market shares used to signal dominance (shares of 50% and above in European Court of Justice)
Commission works with rule of thumb of 40% to 45%
High market share necessary but not sufficient condition
Consider potential changes over time, whether it is temporary monopoly position
Scope for consumer countervailing buyer power
Whether conduct is an abuse of market power
Whether conduct reduces consumer welfare
Evidence of market power/dominance is not a breach of competition law. Need evidence of such power being abused and detriment to consumers
Ultimately,
Markets have to be investigated on a case-to-case basis
Not a tick-box approach
Factors that influence market competition are informed by economic models and concepts
There is no single definition of effective competition
Need market-specific analysis to evaluate impact on welfare
Structure-Conduct-Performance Model (SCP)
Structure determines conduct
Assumes profit maximization and price competition
Structure determines performance via impact on conduct
Useful framework to identify core issues in industrial economics
Explain determinants of competition and outcomes of competition
Market structure here is determined to...