#3075 - General Negligence - GDL Tort Law

• Structure

  - Definition: breach of a legal duty of care which results in damage, undesired by the defendant, to the claimant (Winfield).

  - Negligence structure:

  • 1. Parties

  • 2. Liability:

    • Damage

    • Duty

    • Breach

    • Causation

    • Remoteness

  • 3. Defences

  • 4. Remedies

  - Set out parties + heads of loss, then deal with each claim: break down into heads of loss.

  Duty of Care

  A. Does duty exist?

  - 1. Existing precedent? (incremental approach – Caparo v Dickman).

  • manufacturer to consumer (Donoghue v Stevenson)

  • employer to employee (Paris v Stepney BC)

  • doctor to patient (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee)

  • parent/adult to child (Surtees v Kingston BC)

  • school to pupil (Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis)

  • driver to passenger/pedestrian (Nettleship v Weston) + pilot to passenger (Morris v Murray)

  • contracting parties (Stansbie v Troman)

  • reference giver to former employee (Spring v Guardian Assurance plc)

  • advocate to client (Hall & Co v Simons) + auditor to client (Law Society v KPMG)

  • referee to player (Vowles v Evans) + regulator to player (Watson v British Boxing Board of Control).

  - 2. Novel situations: Caparo v Dickman test (universal: Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd)

  • 1. loss reasonably foreseeable: objective test (Donoghue v Stevenson).

  • 2. proximity (D v S neighbour principle: e.g. Hill v CC W Yorks: police not proximate to all potential victims).

  • 3. policy: ‘fair, just + reasonable’: insurance, defensive practices, crushing liability, floodgates (e.g. Marc Rich v Bishop Rock Marine: no duty because risk governed by shipping law).

  - … Restricted duty situation?: policy considerations negate duty.

  • Lawyers: no blanket immunity (Hall & Co v Simons), but only liable in criminal case if negligence affected outcome (Hunter v CC W Midlands Police).

  • Police: general duty to public, not individuals (Hill),

    • no duty: policy failings (Hill v CC W Yorks; Brooks v MPC; Osman v UK: no duty to warn); respond to alarm (Alexandrou x Oxford); inform witness of disturbing case (Leach v CC Gloucester).

    • duty: operations (Rigby v CC Northamptonshire: negligent use of CS gas); informers (Swinney v CC Northumbria (No2): but still no breach); prisoners (Reeves v MPC); staff (Waters v MPC).

  • Fire brigade: general duty to public, not individuals (John Munroe; Church of JCLDS v W Yorks FA).

    • no duty: respond to individual emergency + insufficient proximity once arrive (John Munroe (Acrylics) v London Fire Authority; Church of JCLDS v W Yorks FA)

    • duty: positive act making situation worse (Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire CC)

  • Ambulance service: duty to respond within reasonable time – objective: dep. on circs (Kent v Griffiths: part NHS).

  • Public/local authorities:

    • generally no liability: if has acted within statutory power + proper exercise of discretion (Stovin v Wise); policy decisions (Palmer v Tees HA: victim of psychiatric patient; X v Bedfordshire CC: did not remove child from abusive parents – but Z v UK: ECtHR rules for c.); burden too high (Mitchell v Glasgow CC: no duty to warn neighbour attacked by tenant); courts reluctant to extend (Gorringe v Calderdale MBC).

    • exception: special relationship (Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis: school + child; Barrett v Enfield LBC: child in care); reliance (W v Essex CC: assurance re: foster child; Phelps v Hillingdon BC: dyslexia misdiagnosis).

  • Armed forces:

    • no duty: soldiers in battle (Mulcahy v MOD).

    • duty in other circs (Barrett v MOD: assumption of responsibility; Jebson v MOD; Bici v MOD).

  • Rescuers: treated favourably: duty owed (Haynes v Harwood) direct to rescuer (Videan v British Transport Comm)

    • only if emergency (Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd: dr. in mine; cf. Cutler v United Daires Ltd: stopping horse).

  • Omissions: i.e. failing to make thinks better ([Lunney & Oliphant])

    • generally no liability (Yuen Kun Yeu v AG Hong Kong; Stovin v Wise: ‘something more’ than foreseeability + proximity needed).

    • exceptions: 1. statute; 2. contract (Stansbie v Troman; Watson v BBBC); 3. high control (Reeves v MPC); 4. voluntary assumption of responsibility (Costello v CC N’bria Police: policeman to colleague during work; Barrett v MOD); 5. d. creating risk (Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire CC).

  • Acts of 3^rd Parties:

    • generally no liability (Smith v Littlewoods Org Ltd).

    • exceptions (Smith v Littlewoods Org Ltd): 1. vicarious liability; 2. proximity d + c. (Stansbie v Troman: contract; cf. Palmer v Tees HA: insufficient proximity); 3. d. controls 3^rd party (Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co: boys in care; Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis: teacher + 4-y.o.); 4. danger created by d’s negligence (Haynes v Harwood; cf. Topp v London Country Bus Ltd: insufficient risk); 5. danger on d’s premises if aware of 3^rd party presence (Smith v Littlewoods).

B. Harm to actual claimant foreseeable?

• harm to actual c. must be foreseeable (Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co; Bourhill v Young),

• sufficient that c. part of foreseeable class of claimants (Donoghue v Stevenson: customers; Haley v London Electricity Board: blind; Paris v Stepney BC: 1-eyed needs extra precautions).

• Damage

  Pure Economic Loss (loss not flowing directly from any physical damage)

  - Generally: physical damage + consequential economic loss recoverable, NOT PEL – Spartan Steel v Martin.

  • loss from damage to another’s property (Weller v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute).

  • defective items: cannot claim for defect, but can claim for damage caused by defect (e.g: Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities: lobsters not faulty pump; Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No2): no PEL claim w/out contract; Murphy v Brentwood DC: inherent defect PEL; D&F Estates v Church Comms for England: defective plaster PEL).

    • but complex structure theory: damage caused to 1 part of building by another part recoverable (D&F Estates v Church Comms for England; Murphy v Brentwood DC: [Ld Bridge]).

    • (despite earlier expansion: Anns v Merton LBS; Junior Books v Veitchi: PEL when resp. assumed + reliance Murphy v Brentood: Junior Books = e.g. of Hedley Byrne v Heller principle).

  - Exception: negligent misstatements: if 1. special rel.; 2. reasonable reliance – Hedley Byrne v Heller (advertisers v bank).

  • (if NMS actual damage: normal principles – Clay v Crump & Sons Ltd).

  • 1. special rel. between parties: d. knows advice will be relied upon duty of care (Hedley Byrne)

    • special skill/knowledge of d. (Hedley Byrne: [Ld Morris]: required; Esso Petroleum v Mardon: station throughput).

    • formal/considered advice (Hedley Byrne: [Ld] Devlin]: like contract).

      • can be in social context (Chaudhry v Prabhakar)

    • statement made for specific known purpose (Caparo v Dickman; James McNaughton Paper v Hicks Anderson); must be used for that purpose (Al-Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley)

    • assumption of responsibility (Spring v Guardian Assurance cf. Williams v Natural Life Health Foods: franchiser did not assume); inc. omissions (Lennon v MPC); can extend to unproximate 3^rd parties (Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd)

      • but limits: disclaimer (Hedley Byrne); policy considerations (Caparo v Dickman: auditors only responsible to shareholders not investors)

  • 2. reasonable reliance by c. on advice:

    • a. c. must actually rely: but for test: would not have acted otherwise (JEB Fasteners v Mark Bloom & Co)

    • b. reliance must be reasonable (Yianni v Edwin Evans: young buyer on BS survey; Smith v Eric S Bush: purchaser of modest house on surveyor report; cf. Stevenson v Nationwide BS: NOT estate agent on BS survey; James McNaughton v Hicks Anderson: NOT experienced business people on draft accounts).

      • factors: James McNaughton Paper v Hicks Anderson: purpose statement made/communicated; rel. between advisor, advisee, 3^rd party; size of recipient class; c’s knowledge/experience; whether statement could be reasonably relied on).

  • if contract: Misrepresentation Act 1967: contractual liability, easier + awards more generous.

  • disclaiming liability: UCTA 1977: s1(3)(a): only in course of business; s2(1): cannot disclaim death/PI; s2(2): all other exclusions must be reasonable; s11 + Sch 2: factors – bargaining power, alt. sources, difficulty, practical consequences, loss (e.g. Smith v Eric Bush: disclaimer unreasonable – knew would be relied on).

  • reliance by 3^rd party: c. can claim if harm to c. reasonably foreseeable (MOH v Sharp: holder of charge on land; Ross v Caunters/White v Jones: bs. of will; Spring v Guardian Assurance: recipient of reference; cf. Goodwidd v British Pregnancy Advisory Services: not foreseeable that advice re contraception passed on + relied upon).

  - Other exceptions:

  • breach of statutory duty: if PEL reasonably foreseeable (MOH v Sharp)

  • breach of fiduciary duty: esp. will drafting (Ross v Caunters; White v Jones)

  • Murphy v Brentwood obiter: 1. adjoining occupiers; 2. complex structure theory.

  • 3^rd party with special relationship (Ross v Caunters; White v Jones; Carr-Glynn v Frearsons; Walker v Medicott)

  • references: assumption of responsibility (Spring v Guardian Assurance)

  Wrongful life: generally no liability (McFarlane v Tayside Health Board: can claim for pain + discomfort of pregnancy + birth, but not raising child; Rees v Dalington Hospital NHS Trust: disabled mother cannot claim extra cost of raising child).

  Breach

  1. What Is the Standard of Care (Law: judge decides)?

  - General standard: reasonably competent person in all the circs. – objective (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co).

  • reasonable man: ‘man in the Clapham Omnibus/man who takes magazines at home + pushes lawn-mower in shirt-sleeves’ (...