Supervision 9 – Experts, Warnings and Appeals
The opinion rule and the presentation of expert evidence
General rule is that opinion evidence excluded.
Exceptions to the rule out of necessity:
Evidence of identity.
Evidence of a witness’s own feelings (Hendy).
Handwriting proved by non-expert (Tilley).
Matters of impression and narrative.
Expert opinion
Regulated by CPR, Part 19.
Admissible only in relation to matters of fact (e.g. Cockburn).
Wide range of expert fields (e.g. Stockwell / Otway / Cooper / Robb).
New areas of learning too speculative (e.g. Gilfoyle).
But experts in earprints accepted in Dallagher.
Must show relevant professional qualifications.
Solicitor who had hobby of handwriting sufficient in Silverlock.
Policeman able to give evidence on likelihood of collision having served in traffic division for 15 years (Oakley).
Evidence of lip-readers admitted in Luttrell. Test:
It must be demonstrated that study or experience will give a witness’s opinion an authority that the opinion of one not so qualified will lack; and
Does subject matter of the opinion form part of a body or knowledge that is sufficiently organised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience?
The witness must be so qualified to express that opinion.
Rejected requirement of reliability.
Law Commission support statutory reliability test.
Edmond and Roberts suggest setting up a panel to advise on reliability at admissibility stage.
Reject approaches in Frye and Daubert.
Court will not refuse expert evidence if approach is contentious (e.g. Robb).
Law Commission recommended that test of admissibility be put on statutory footing. Rejected on grounds of cost.
If question falls outside scope of particular witness’s expertise, opinion ought not to be received (Nightingale v Biffen).
Expert opinion will not be needed where court capable of drawing inferences for itself (e.g. Ugoh).
Danger of using psychiatrists or psychologists (Turner).
But people with IQ of less than 70 will require expert evidence (Henry).
Cannot merely be used to verify reliability of a witness (Robinson).
Judge must tell jury they are not obliged to accept expert’s view (O’Brien, Hall and Sherwood).
Cannings suggests that where there is conflicting expert evidence, there must be corroboration by independent evidence.
Denounced in Kai-Whitewind. Conflicting evidence fine.
Courts occasionally admitted testimony of psychologists to explain behaviour of parties who could be described as ‘normal’ (Lowery and King v R).
Turner stressed that Lowery is exceptional.
Experts not being able to deliver opinion on the ‘ultimate issue’ no longer a rule (Stockwell / Fitzpatrick).
Direction must be given that jury do not have to accept evidence of expert’s own opinion (Hardy).
Expert must inform court of sources upon which he relies (CJA 2003, s.127 / Abadom).
Must make it clear if he is advancing a hypothesis (Re AB).
General suspicion to the way in which statistical evidence is presented to juries (Clark (Sally)). Obiter would have quashed – once in every 100 years.
Talk in terms of likelihood, rather than using figures.
General test:
Necessary (Robinson)?
Expert (Silverlock)
Reliability of field (Luttrell)
Require two or more people in the field (Anderson).
Impartial (CPR 19.2)
Corroboration
English law has no general principle that a defendant cannot be convicted on a single piece of uncorroborated evidence (Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994).
In Scotland cannot convict on one piece of evidence.
But held in Makanjuola that direction may still be given in appropriate cases.
Witness’s evidence might be tainted by improper motive (Benedetto).
Patients detained in a secure hospital complained of ill-treatment (Spencer).
Witness retracted accusation then retracted retraction in Walker.
Prosecution can call a witness when they want to rely on one part of his evidence but not another (Cairns).
Careful jury direction needed for cell confessions (Pringle / Benedetto / Stone – conviction for murder rested substantially on cell confession).
Lewis supports evidence-based approach to caution warnings.
Beck test given when witness tainted with improper motive:
(a) General duty to put the defence case fairly to the jury and to draw attention to items of the prosecution case which are actually or potentially unreliable; and
(b) In specific cases, to give a warning about certain witnesses who may have an interest of their own to serve in giving evidence
Birch argues that judges must resist temptation to give full warnings. Supports Beck test.
Inferences drawn from lies told by the defendant – Lucas directions
CoA in Burge and Pegg suggested where Lucas direction called for:
Defence relies upon an alibi that is shown to be false.
Where prosecution seeks to show that something D said in relation to a separate issue was a lie, and the prosecution relies on that lie as evidence of guilt (e.g. Blick).
Where judge envisages that jury will be tempted to draw an inference that prosecution are relying on D’s having told a lie.
Not necessary in every contested handling case (Barnett).
Must be real risk that jury may treat a lie, without more, as evidence of guilt (e.g. Smith). Must relate to a material matter.
Must be independent evidence of the lie.
Judge must tell jury:
They must decide whether they are sure that D actually told the lie.
Must consider why D lied.
Adverse inferences drawn only if jury sure that D lied to avoid guilt (Richens / Woodward).
Warns the jury not to equate lies with guilt.
Appeals
Appeals from conviction on indictment are all heard in CoA (Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s.1(1)).
Trial judge can grant a certificate that case is fit for appeal.
Very rare (Parkin).
Where leave is granted if appellant admitted his guilt in Crown Court:
Situations espoused in Forde:
Appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit he was guilty of it.
Upon the admitted facts he could not in law have been convicted of the offences charged.
Guilty plea induced by trial judge’s wrong ruling in law (e.g. Clarke).
Incorrect ruling of law leaves D with no legal escape of guilt, but not where D is merely influenced (Chalkley).
Interest of justice may demand an appeal (e.g. Lee).
Spencer argues for setting up regional Courts of Appeal to ease workload.
Appeal against sentence
A person convicted on indictment may appeal against any sentence passed on him by Crown Court (CAA, s.9).
‘Sentence’ interpreted widely (CAA, s.50).
A person sentenced following summary conviction may appeal (CAA, s.10).
Unless Crown Court judge certifies that the case is fit for appeal, an appeal against sentence lies only with leave (CAA, s.11).
Determination of appeals against conviction
CAA, s.2(1): CoA ‘shall allow an appeal against conviction if they think the conviction is unsafe’.
But old test still applicable (e.g. Mullen).
Emphasis is on fairness of trial rather than safety of conviction (Condron v United Kingdom / confirmed in Togher).
CoA allowed to overturn a conviction if there was a ‘lurking doubt’ about jury’s verdict (Cooper).
But this is rare.
But circumstances of ‘unsafe’ must be exceptional (Pope).
Should factual accuracy always give way to due process (Spencer)?
Turnbull direction inherently about factual accuracy.
Errors in trial as grounds of appeal
Crucial question is whether conviction is safe.
Appeals based on inadequacy of counsel are based on fairness of trial (Nangle).
Test of Wednesbury unreasonableness suggested in Ullah.
CoA very critical of this ground of appeal in Smith.
Effect of appeal
If conviction found to be unsafe, conviction quashed (CAA, s.2(2)).
Discretion to order retrial in interests of justice (CAA 1968, s.7).
Factors to consider in Saunders.
Period since original trial / was appellant in custody / strength of case against him
Retrial ordered despite adverse publicity in Stone.
If jury is hung, test in Bell – third retrial (is it abuse of process):
That the alleged offence was one of extreme gravity; and
That the evidence against the defendant was very powerful.
Power to issue writ of venire de novo arises when procedural irregularity of such fundamental mistake that trial is a nullity.
CAA s.3 – can’t make sentence more severe:
If the jury, convicted the appellant as charged, but could have returned a verdict of not guilty as charged but guilty of a lesser offence, CoA can substitute a conviction for the lesser offence.
If jury convicted of one of two counts on the indictment in the alternative, and were discharged from giving a verdict on the other count, CoA can reverse the verdict.
Once appeal dealt with, appellant debarred from bringing a second appeal in the matter (Pinfold).
Crown can appeal to Supreme Court against decision to allow appeal on only one ground. SC can decide issue (Mandair).
Appeal process
Appellant need not be present but he is entitled to attend if he wishes.
CoA has discretionary power to receive evidence under CAA, s.23.
Fresh evidence can be admitted if it promotes a line of defence not raised at trial (Ahluwahlia).
For conviction to be unsafe, need to show that fresh evidence ‘would have made a difference’ (Pendleton).
Appeals from the magistrates’ courts
Appeals to the Crown Court
A person sentenced by the magistrates following a guilty plea may only appeal against his sentence (Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s.108(1)).
Possible to appeal against plea of guilty...