Case Management & Relief from Sanctions
CPR 3.9
Role of Courts – tension between objects
Court provides law enforcement service underpinning rule of law
To discharge that function and enforce rights – court must correctly apply law to facts – establishing the truth
Balancing act – no entitlement to best possible – optimisation
Law enforcement (truth value) – need for accuracy
Time – need for expeditious enforcement
Resources – public policy
Require ‘reasonable level’ – sufficient to inspire confidence in the system
Rationale
Importance of case management
Fair rationing of resources
Otherwise present parties in particular dispute would consume inordinate resources
Court time as a (finite) resource
Allocate evenly between cases
Allocate in accordance with cost of cases? – emotional/personal value
Dworkin – whether investment in procedure should be proportionate to economic value
Harm caused as consequence of decision – necessary to expend more resources to get it right
When error occurs –
Economic cost of error
Moral harm – variable / connected to economic cost?
Particularly significant in criminal context – reason for higher standard of proof
In accordance with complexity of cases
Viability of arguments? Prospects of success?
“Three-dimensional justice”
Substantive fairness <> expeditiousness <> limited resources
Proportionate relationship between means (litigation expense) and ends (determination on merits)
And within reasonable time — justice delayed is justice denied
Dworkin —
No litigant has a right to the most accurate procedures for determining disputes
Agree
Litigants have right to procedures that assess the risk & extent of moral harm if just outcome not reached, and equal distribution of resources on that basis
BUT this says nothing about the total amount of resources that should be devoted to justice within the State
IE Court resourcing not in a vacuum — eg possible that no of judges has to be increased
Court as a public service
Not merely a private dispute settlement system
Public significance & precedential value
Analogy with medical services – or any other public service
Or telecom bandwidth, or water
All require management of resource distribution to end user
Objective of management – CPR 1.1 “overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly”
Forces at work in allocation of resources
Two levels
Formal level
Economic level
Economic activity follows the most rewarding path (not very altruistic…)
Rules required to avoid arbitrary justice – procedural rules as well as substantive rules
Need to ensure compliance
Defendant has motivation to delay
Doesn’t comply with rules, orders
Can have costs ramifications, in theory
Court has power to make ‘peremptory’ order – strike out of defence
Defendant resists strike-out application
Appeals
Lawyers have economic incentive to prolong litigation
AZ suggests judges do as well…
Consequences is other form of delay in form of satellite litigation
Not about formalities, but about procedure
Effect of cost – limits access to courts
Cost of litigation unpredictable – depends on length
Costs not available until final determination
Legal aid available to impecunious litigants – no longer available in civil cases
Historical perspective
Pre-Judicature Acts 1875
Claimants had to bring claim within particular form
No difference between substantive right & procedure
Focus on technicalities – protracted & expensive
Different courts for different actions – Chancery & Common law
Defendant would first try to find fault in the form – non-suited / strike out
Judicature Acts
Forms of action abolished
All claims brought by writ
Focus on merits
Modern system of pleadings established
1883 RSC O 7 r 1 – non-compliance with rules does not render proceedings void unless court so directs – can be set aside as irregular/amended/dealt with as judge thinks fit
provides wider discretion
loosens procedural strictures
Sharp divide between pre-trial & trial
Pretrial – pleadings, disclosure
Trial – continuous, fact-finding & submissions
Position under old RSC
Broad discretion to strike out or waive irregularity: Ord 2 r 1; Metroinvest Anstalt v Commercial Union Insurance
Discretion only used very sparingly — Birkett v James [1978] AC 297, (delay by plaintiff – defendant applies to strike out claim for inordinate and inexcusable delay
Diplock LJ: Discretion to strike out should be exercised only where either:
(1) default intentional – conduct amounting to abuse of process or disobedience of peremptory order – challenge to court’s authority; or
(2) (a) inordinate and inexcusable delay and (b) delay will give rise to substantial risk that not possible to have a fair trial of the issues – eg deterioration of evidence
Relieves burdens of rules – or undermines the rules – regarding time limits for disclosure — essentially encouraged delays
Created uncertainty — further litigation about interpretation of standard
Heavy emphasis on justice on the merits
But failure to police procedure permitted tactical litigation to dominant & obstruct a determination on the merits
Court’s role was reactive rather than proactive
Reforms to ensure compliance with procedural orders
Wolfe Report 1998 – current civil procedure rules enacted
Creates infrastructure for better management of system
Rise of case management
Achieve savings of resources & time
Difficulties now with distribution of resources to case management
Woolf hoped that CPR 3.9 would lead to change in culture
BUT – Statistics
Following reform of 1875 – cost of litigation rose
Following Wolfe reforms – cost of litigation rose again
Causes
Formal – Mismanagement by judges
Economic – Financial incentives for protracting litigation remain
Excessive discretionary factors in CPR 3.9 (relief from sanctions for non-compliance)
Leads to uncertainty & complication, which spawns further litigation, appeals etc
Objective to decrease litigation and make economical – but in reality creates further disputes about compliance
Jackson report 2010 – amend CPR 3.9 to remove list of discretionary factors — now to look at all circs incl (a) efficiency & (b) need to enforce compliance
(a) simply restates overall objectives; (b) is a truism
Jackson noted that courts had become too tolerant & lost sight of culture of delay & noncompliance
Relief from Sanctions
(1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need –
(a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and
(b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.
Applies to sanctions—
Only where sanction imposed for non-compliance with rule, PD, or court order
IE not where no sanction imposed
Failure to comply with time limit in rules — eg Notice of intention to rely on hearsay evidence under CPR 33.2(4)(a)
Has nonetheless been applied in such cases — eg to extend time to exchange witness statements: Bansal v Cheema
But Dyson LJ refused to apply it to extension of time to appeal under CPR 3.1 before expiry of time limit in Robert v Momentum
Better to apply to all cases — should be no distinction between rules and court-imposed sanctions
<> CPR 3.10 applies to failure to comply with rule or PD — court can make order to remedy & doesn’t invalidate
Sanction has effect unless a party obtains relief (CPR 3.8(1))
The court is to consider (1)(a) efficiency and proportionate cost (b) the need to enforce compliance (CPR 3.9)
Says little that isn’t already in the rules —
(a) merely restates overriding objective in CPR 1.1
(b) merely says that the rules should be enforced
Proportionality — it is legitimate to debar a party without regard to the merits if they forfeit their opportunity for a trial by noncompliance with orders
Also requires that orders are fair & give reasonable period of time
Dyson MR speaking extrajudicially — justice does not mean only a decision on the merits — emphasis on overriding objective is to eliminate lax application
But no clear standard, no exhaustive list
Many judges still have regard to old factors
Remaining problems with CPR 3.9
Judges too willing to use discretion to grant relief, striking out only in extreme circs
Earlier draft by Jackson — “primary need to enforce compliance with rules, PD & orders save where there as been (a) good reason for the default or (b) in exceptional circs”
Clearer & gives a standard
Leaves residual discretion but gives clear guidance
Application of CPR 3.9
Mitchell v New Group Newspapers (2013, CA)
Failure to file costs budget — Master imposed sanction of court fees only — CA dismissed appeal
No relief unless —
(i) breach is trivial or
breach of form rather than substance
narrowly missed time limit
BUT — as to degree, or intention, or effect, or both?
(ii) there is a good reason for it
solicitor suffered from a debilitating illness / accident
Later developments showing period for compliance originally imposed was unreasonable, seemed reasonable at the time and could not realistically have been appealed
<> mere overlooking a deadline
Factors of (a) efficiency & proportionality and (b) need to enforce rules were of “paramount...