Three Certainties
- 3 certainties (1. intention; 2. subject matter; 3. object) needed to enforce trust ([Langdale MR], Knight v Knight).
1. Certainty of Intention: imperative, not precatory wording needed.
no technical language necessary ([Jessel MR], Richards v Delbridge; [Megarry J], Re Kayford).
can be by conduct (Paul v Constance).
NOT precatory language (Lambe v Eaves; e.g. Re Adams v Kensington Vestry: ‘in full confidence she will do what is right’; Jones v Locke: cheque ‘for baby’ insufficient).
imperative language (Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury: ‘in full confidence she will leave it to such of my nieces etc’)
context: whole doc. considered (Re Adams; Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury: gift over in default certainty)
if uncertain: absolute gift.
2. Certainty of subject matter
a. property must be clearly defined:
Palmer v Simmonds: ‘bulk’ no.
Re Golay’s WT: ‘reasonable yes (as far as courts will go).
b. segregation:
tangible property: must be segregated – specifically identifiable (Re London Wine; Re Goldcorp).
intangible property: need not be segregated (Hunter v Moss, [Dillon LJ]).
BUT CRITICISED: all proprietary rights need to be over specific property (Re Harvard Securities: [Neuberger J] criticised, followed Goldcorp for Australian shares; MacJordan Construction v Brookmount Erostin).
if uncertain:
trust fails (RT).
gift with trust attached donee takes free of trust.
3. Certainty of object
fixed trust: complete list test – conceptual + evidential certainty (IRC v Broadway Cottages).
discretionary trust: is/is not test – conceptual certainty only (Re Gulbenkian; McPhail v Doulton).
application: Re Baden’s DT (No 2) (3 different ratios):
[Sachs LJ]: conceptual certainty only – label must be clear; burden on c. to prove part of class.
[Megaw LJ]: class certain if ‘substantial number’ can be proved to be within (but: circular).
[Stamp LJ]: must be conceptually + evidentially certain (relatives = next of kin) (but: too strict).
BUT: subject to admin. workability: R v District Auditor for W Yorks MCC: ‘inhabitants of W. Yorks’.
power: is/is not test (Re Gulbenkian).
NOT subject to admin. workability (Re Manistry’s ST).
gift subject to condition precedent: some conceptual certainty allowed (Re Barlow’s WT: ‘friends’ allowed).
Formalities
Creating New Trust
- Testamentary trusts: s9 Wills Act 1837: 1. writing; 2. signed by testator (or another at his direction + in presence); 3. attested by 2 or more witnesses.
failure: will void.
- Inter vivos trusts:
most property: no formalities (Paul v Constance).
land: s53(1)(b) LPA 1925: 1. evidenced in writing; 2. signed by settlor.
failure: unenforceable (but not void: valid from date of declaration).
exception: fraud (express trust: Rouchefoucauld v Boustead; RT: Hodgson v Marks; CT: Bannister v Bannister).
exception: implied trusts (CT + RT) – s53(2) LPA 1925 (e.g. Hodgson v Marks: RT, no need to comply with s53(1)(b)).
Disposing of Subsisting Equitable Interest
- Prima facie: s53(1)(c) LPA 1925: 1. in writing; 2. signed by grantor (or authorised agent).
disposition inc. direction to ts. to hold on trust for another: Grey v IRC: [HoL].
but N.B.: oral instruction to ts. + later evidential writing can satisfy s53(1)(c).
BUT CRITICISED: transfer itself should be in writing need HC case + leapfrog appeal to SC.
exception: implied trusts (s53(2) LPA 1925).
failure: disposition void.
- Vandervell v IRC exception: s53(1)(c) does not apply where: 1. b. absolutely entitled; 2. intention to transfer legal + equitable title (rationale: trust collapsed ts. do not need to know who bs. are).
(N.B. only if legal title effectively transferred: Zeitel v Kaye).
- Contract to assign existing beneficial interest: Neville v Wilson: CT, so s53(1)(c) does not apply (s53(2)).
- Sub-Trusts: DEBATE over whether s53(1)(c) applies.
[Hayton] theory: dep. on whether whole or part of property disposed.
whole property disposed s53(1)(c) applies (disposition in effect: original b. drops out of picture).
part disposed s53(1)(c) NOT apply (new trust, not disposition).
judicial support: Grainge v Wilberforce; Re Lashmar.
[Penner] theory: s53(1)(c) NEVER applies (always new trust: original b. can never drop out – must receive 1st).
(if land: s53(1)(b) applies; other property: no formalities: Paul v Constance).
judicial support: Nelson v Greening & Sykes (original b. now t. of interest for sub-b); Zeitel v Kaye (p36).
[Green] theory: s53(1)(c) ALWAYS applies (literal reading of statute) – but: unpopular.
Constitution
- Structure:
1. break down q. + identify type of intended transfer – Milroy v Lord:
1. absolute gift: constitution only (intention + transfer of legal title).
2. self-declaration of trust: formalities only (valid declaration of trust).
3. settlement of transfer: constitution + formalities (valid declaration of trust + transfer of legal title).
4. Vandervell exception: constitution only (becomes absolute gift)
2. requirements for effecting that method (Milroy v Lord).
3. general rule: equity will not perfect imperfect transfer.
4. exceptions].
- Rules of constitution
land: s52(1) LPA 1925: by deed (s1 LP(MP)A 1989) + s4/s27 LRA 2002: registration.
chattels: deed of gift or actual delivery + intention (Re Cole).
shares: Stock Transfer Act 1963:
1. STF signed by transferor.
2. registration in co’s share register (a. send form + certificates to registrar; b. registered by registrar).
(private cos: directors can refuse to register transfer if power in arts.)
bills of exchange (cheques): Bills of Exchange Act 1882: to 3rd party by endorsement (sign on back).
money: delivery (cheque: only transfers when money cleared).
choses in action (debts): s136 LPA 1925: writing + notice to debtor/other party.
subsisting equitable interest: s53(1)(c) LPA 1925: in writing, signed.
- Imperfect constitution: prima facie, equity will not assist a volunteer + perfect an imperfect transfer – court cannot construe failed attempt to use 1 method of transfer as another (Milroy v Lord).
failed settlement of transfer: not construed as self-declaration of trust (Milroy v Lord: STF not used for shares).
failed absolute gift: not construed as self-declaration of trust (Jones v Lock: cheque not endorsed; Richards v Delbridge: transfer of lease without new deed).
Exceptions: where equity will perfect imperfect transfer.
- 1. Choithram v Pagarani: 1 of charity trustees (S) already had property vested in him imperfect gift construed as trust by vesting in other ts.
narrow effect: factors – charity (courts more generous: Re Baden’s DT); S. near death (maybe unable to properly transfer).
- 2. Re Rose: transferor has done all in his power.
shares: transfer effective in equity once certificates delivered to directors (before registration) (Re Rose).
registered land: transfer effective in equity once all docs. executed + stamped transfer delivered to transferee (before registration) (Mascall v Mascall).
test (Re Rose + Mascall v Mascall):
1. correct method of transfer used.
2. transferor does everything within power to effect transfer.
3. transfer irrevocable by transferor: docs. sent to party capable of effecting legal transfer (Re Rose) or delivered to donee/irrevocable (Mascall).
- 3. Pennington v Waine: unconscionability (extension of Re Rose), BUT DUBIOUS.
forgoes Re Rose requirement 3: transfer need not necessarily be irrevocable (STF sent to auditor [not yet to co.] + donee acted in reliance).
BUT DUBIOUS:
test unclear: [Arden LJ] refused to define unconscionability.
based on Choitram v Pagarani: v. specific facts + clear intention to create trust (+PC decision).
not applied: Zeitel v Kaye (CoA refused to perfect imperfect gift).
better: e.g. of weak estoppel case (Zeitel v Kaye obiter): 1. statement of fact re: ownership; 2. relied upon.
- 4. Gillett v Holt: proprietary estoppel (1. assurance; 2. detrimental reliance unconscionable to renege).
award: minimum equity required to do justice not nec. what promised.
- 5. Strong v Bird: fortuitous vesting (intended transferee later happens to obtain legal title as PR).
application: imperfect release of debt (Strong v Bird); imperfect gift (Re Stewart).
conditions:
1. immediate gift intended (Re Freeland).
2. continuing intention at time of death (Re Gonin).
3. intended donee becomes executor on death: sole (Stong v Bird) or 1 of several (Re Stewart).
possible extensions of principle: BUT DUBIOUS.
Re James: intended donee becomes administrator (e.g. on intestacy)?
BUT: Re Gonin obiter: [Walton J]: administrator not intended to be given legal title by testator.
Re Ralli’s WT: fortuitous vesting of trust property (e.g. intended t. becomes executor holds as t.)?
BUT: ignores ring-fenced nature of trust property (t. holds in different capacity from e.) will not be followed (ignored earlier decision in Re Brooks ST: no fortuitous vesting of trust property).
- 6. Cain v Moon: donation mortis causa (‘dmc’).
conditions:
1. gift made in contemplation of death: subjective test, but cannot be irrational (Re Miller).
2. gift conditional on death: i.e. revoked if donor recovers.
3. actual/constructive delivery of property: donor must pass dominion (indica or ev. of title).
land: deeds/key to deeds (Sen v Headley).
bank a/c: deposit book (Birch v Treasury Solicitory); post-office savings bank book (Re Weston).
cheque: (Re Mead).
Covenants to settle (promise to create trust – but not constituted: e.g. ‘after-acquired’ property: settlor does not yet own).
1. consideration...