(i) clear promise/representation by one party (ii) which the other has relied on (iii) and it is inequitable for the promisor to go back on the promise. The burden is on the promisee to prove this: Habib Bank v Tufail. It is a shield, not a sword (Combe v Combe). It operates defensively to prevent the promisor from insisting on their legal rights. This means it can enforce promises in decreasing pacts, but is useless in increasing pacts.
Objective test. The promise must be intended to affect the legal relations between parties (Spence v Shell) and indicate the promisor will not rely on their strict legal rights arising from the contract.
The promise must be clear: BP Exploration v Hunt (No 2). But need not be express: Spence v Shell.
This will not be enough as it does not send a clear message: The Leonidas D. Mere delay does not destroy the ability to insist on the contractual right: Amherst v James Walker.
The promise must have influenced the other party’s conduct (The Scaptrade). But if the promise was only one of the factors relied on, it will not be enough: Brikom Investments v Carr.
There does not in principle have to be detriment: Lord Denning MR in WJ Alan v El Nasr. It is enough that the promise altered his position such that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to act inconsistently with it: The Post Chaser.
The idea is that the promisee has acted in reliance on the promise such that he cannot go back to the pre-promise position: Maharaj v Chand. In The Post Chaser, the contractual right was asserted 2 days after the promise not to. As the promisee had suffered no prejudice and could be restored easily to the pre-promise position, there was no...