Avoiding Occupier’s Liability
Entrusting Work to Independent Contractors
Situation where visitor suffers loss owing to independent contractor’s negligence in carrying out the work
Loss may come from
Manner in which contractors conduct themselves whilst on premises
Defect in premises owing to poor workmanship
So, where visitor suffers damage due to “faulty execution of any work of construction, maintenance, or repair”, Occupier not normally liable if
S.2(4)(b): Reasonable to entrust work to independent contractor.
Giliker: which is accepted as being fulfilled when normally work entrusted to independent contractor
S.2(4)(b): Occupier took reasonable steps to satisfy self that contractor was competent.
Assumption of competence can be made unless occupier knows of previous incompetence
Lord Keith in Ferguson v Welsh [1987]: As long as occupier has reasonably chosen seemingly competent contractor
Is not up to occupier to supervise them all of the time
And only has to supervise if it comes to his attention that unsafe system of work is being used.
Although does extend in some circumstances to check X is a member of their trade’s association or holds relevant qualifications.
S.2(4)(b): Occupier took reasonable steps to satisfy self that work had been done properly.
Ferguson v Welsh [1987]:
Lord Keith:
Would be going a very long way to hold that an occupier of premises liable to the employee of an independent contractor
arising not from the physical state of the premises
but from an unsafe system of work adopted by the contractor.
Three factors pertinent here
Nature of work undertaken
Character of Occupier
Evidence of risk left by contractor’s work
Haseldine v Daw: C injured when life in block of flats fell to bottom of shaft owing to negligence of contractors paid to repair lift
Scott LJ:
The landlord of a block of flats does not profess any technical skill with lifts
Since he can’t rely on his own judgement, his duty of care requires him to seek this advice
Having done this, holding him liable would make him an insurer for an independent contractor’s negligence.
BUT would be hard to argue that Occupier not liable if obvious risk left owing to negligence of independent contractors
Woodward v Mayor of Hastings [1954]: C, a pupil at a school which D was responsible for, was injured falling down icy steps negligently left in this condition by a cleaner.
Du Parqu LJ:
D is liable - The craft of the charwoman may have its mysteries
But there is no quality in the nature of the work which the cleaning of a snow covered step demands
Exclusion Clauses
Liability under the Act may be limited by an express term of a contract/ notice given to visitors
S.2(1) An occupier owes the same duty, the “common law duty”, to all his visitors
Except insofar he is free to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude his duty to any visitor by agreement or otherwise
S.2(5)
The common duty of care does not impose on an occupier any obligation to a visitor in respect of risks willingly accepted by his visitor ([to be determined by normal common law rules])
Occupier can limit liability by displaying notice that people can see when entering
White v Blackmore (1972):
Lord Denning:
Courts are reluctant to hold warning/exemption notices as being binding
Unless drawn to attention of entrant
And assent given by entrant to terms
Otherwise was not part of the contract and therefore inapplicable.
Or through clause in contract visitor enters under
However, either course may engage UCTA 1977 if two requirements are satisfied:
Requirement 1: Term/notice must attempt to exclude or restrict liability for negligence
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977:
S.1(1): “Negligence” means the breach of
(c) the common duty of care per OLA 1957
BUT (b) not a stricter duty
S.2(1) Personal Injury
A person cannot by reference to a contract term or a notice exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury
resulting from negligence
s.14 defines what a notice is (e.g. sign at entrance)
Other damage S.2(2)
In the case of other loss or damage
A person can’t restrict liability resulting from negligence, except so far as the term or notice
Satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.
S.2(3)
Where contract term or notice purporting to exclude liability, it is not in itself to be taken as indicating C’s voluntary acceptance of the risk.
Requirement 2: Must Come from business activities
UCTA 1977 s.1(3):
In both contract and tort, s.2... apply only to business liability
That is (a) things said or done in the course of business
OR (b) from the occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier
As amended by OLA 1987:
S.2: the liability of an occupier of premises, for breach of obligation towards a person obtaining access to the premises for educational or recreational purposes
Being liability from injury suffered owing to the dangerous state of the premises (so won’t help if O runs C down with a tractor)
Is not a business liability of the occupier
Unless granting access for the purposes concerned falls into the business of the occupier
Rogers: e.g. if a farmer has on his land ruinous cattle, (which is his business of keeping them)
Then he won’t be liable if he allows access on the condition he is not liable for death or personal injury
If the cattle then trample the person accessing the land
UNLESS his business is to charge to see the cattle in their natural habitat – and not just keeping them for farming purposes.
Any exclusion is “only so far as he is free to do so”
OLA 1957 s.2(1)
O owes the common duty of care “except so far as he is free to do so and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude his duty
By agreement or otherwise
Rogers: So where permission is deemed or people enter by exercise of right at law, notice restricting liability unlikely to assist
Ashdown v Samuel Williams and Sons [1956]: (pre dates OLA 1957) C licensee on land belonging to D, when knocked down by railway trucks negligently being shunted along a railway line. Notices had been posted by D all over the place that people entered at their own risk.
Held
D had taken reasonable steps to bring exemption to bring the conditions to C’s attention.
Rogers: Case would have gone over way now b/c D engaged in business activities – but might be evidence for principle that despite lack of express contract
Accords with principle that if can exclude from land altogether, can’t I permit...