#2358 - Rylands V Fletcher Rule And Application - Tort Law

Rylands v Fletcher – the rule and its significance

Area of Effect

• Where But C’s land/activities are interfered with

  • By an “isolated escape” from D’s neighbouring land

    • Rather than a continuing nuisance

• Rylands v Fletcher [1866]: A builds reservoir on land to help his mill, builds it so it is near some disused mine tunnels belonging to B which are not blocked up. Water put into reservoir escapes from the reservoir down these tunnels and flood B’s mines.

  • Lord Cairns:

    • The person who,

      • for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there

      • anything that is not natural to the land and its enjoyment

      • and it likely to do mischief if it escapes,

        • must keep it in at his peril;

          • and if he does not do so, is answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape

  • Lord Cransworth:

    • The question in general is not whether D has acted with/without due care and caution,

      • but whether his acts have occasioned the damage

Requirements for Liability

• D brings onto his land for his own purpose something likely to do mischief if it escapes

  • Rylands v Fletcher

    • Blackburn J: could be beasts, or water, or filth or stenches

  • Transco Plc v Stockport MBC [2003]:

    • Lord Bingham:

      • Test should not be easily satisfied

        • Must be shown D has done something he has recognised/ought to have recognised

          • as giving rise to exceptionally high risk of danger if there should be an escape

            • No matter how unlikely escape is.

• And land was being used in a non-natural way

  • Lord Cairns in Rylands v Fletcher [1866]: introducing something to the land which in the land’s natural condition would not have this something upon it

  • Giliker: Thing must be being put to some special use which brings it with increased danger to others

    • Not merely the ordinary use of the land or the use as is proper for the general benefit of the community

  • Read v Lyons [1947]:

    • Lord Porter:

      • In deciding this question, all the circumstances of time and practice of mankind must be taken into consideration

        • So that what may be regarded as dangerous or non-natural may vary according to the circumstances

  • Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994]:

    • Lord Goff:

      • Test could be whether D’s use is reasonable or not

      • BUT whether D has taken reasonable care or not is irrelevant

        • If there is an escape causing damage

          • D will be liable

  • Transco Plc v Stockport MBC [2003]:

    • Lord Bingham

      • Land put to some special use which increases its danger

        • “Ordinary user” test better than non-natural user

          • Means engaged only when use is extraordinary and unusual

          • Although what is extraordinary or unusual may vary from time to time and in different contexts.

    • Lord Hoffmann

      • Useful guide =

        • Is the damage which eventuated something against which the occupier could not reasonably be expected to have insured himself against?

      • If so, then better to go down insurance route than litigation route

        • If not = non-natural use of land

    • Lord Scott

      • Use of land cannot be considered non-natural

        • If it is expressly authorised by statute

• Foreseeability of Damage

  • Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994]:

    • Lord Goff:

      • Fact that standard of care taken is irrelevant to liability

        • Doesn’t mean D can be liable for damage he could not have reasonably foreseen

      • Two reasons:

        • Law of negligence development for 60 years points strongly towards a requirement for foreseeability

        • C in ordinary circumstances only able to claim damages for personal injuries where can prove such foreseeability by D.

          • Seems illogical to have a stronger protection for interference with C’s land

• Intentional release?

  • Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire (1985)

    • Taylor J: intentional/direct harm is trespass, not nuisance (which is indirect).

  • Crown River Cruises Ltd. v Kimbolton Fireworks Ltd (1996)

    • Held

      • An intentional release of fireworks (not deliberately aimed at another’s land) fell within Rylands v Fletcher.

  • Can probs make the two consistent – i.e. it’s not Rylands if there was a deliberate move intended to release onto the other person’s land (not just an intentional release)

Bringing a claim

• Who can sue?

  • Transco Plc v Stockport MBC [2003]:

    • Only parties with right over land may bring an action under Rylands v Fletcher rule

    • And the rule only allows recovery for property damage, not personal injury

• Who can be sued?

  • Occupier of the land is capable of having suit brought against him if the tort is satisfied

    • But licensees such as the millowner in Rylands v Fletcher would also be capable of being sued.

Defences to liability

• Claimant Defaults

  • If escape wholly or partly due to C’s fault

    • Then D is not to be found liable

    • E.g. C’s horse stretches over a fence, eats a poisoned berry from D’s land, and dies

      • D not liable – no escape and harm suffered owing to horse’s own conduct.

  • Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 also applies

• Unforeseeable act of stranger

  • Stranger to either C or D’s land

    • Without D’s knowledge

    • And not reasonably foreseeable by D

      • Interferes with D’s land causing escape to C’s land

        • D is not liable.

  • Giliker: three problems here

    • Who is a stranger?

      • Obviously a trespasser

      • But how about licensees over whom D does not exercise control?

        • Ribee v Norrie [2001]: C’s home caught fire owing to act of X leaving a smouldering cigarette around in a hostel operated by D.

          • Held: act of X foreseeable and D could have exercised precautionary control to stop cigarettes being left around/lighted

            • Therefore D liable b/c not stranger.

    • Negligent Acts of X?

      • Logically doesn’t seem to be a problem to the defence that X did not act intentionally

        • Real question = Is D able to foresee the act of X?

    • Problem then is = isn’t this negligence in disguise?

      • Street on Torts: all cases allowing this defence have been decided wrongly – nothing to do with Rylands v Fletcher but ordinary claim of negligence.

      • Giliker: Perhaps takes this a little too far. Principles have influenced this rule, but still conceptually distinct.

• Act of God

  • D not liable where escape is soley due to circumstances where no foresight or prudence could reasonably recognise the possibility of such an occurrence and therefore guard against it

    • Giliker: has only been pleaded successfully once, and owing to technological and scientific advances, is probably defunct in all but exceptionally rare cases.

• Statutory Authority

  • If Statute either authorises the potentially mischief-making activity

  • Or excludes liability from an escape

    • Then this will be a valid defence

• Consent

  • May be express or implied

    • Normally implied where escape occurs from something of common benefit to C and D

      • E.g. in block of flats from nuisance caused by escape from guttering

        • Tenant presumed to forego any rights against landlord, due to benefit gained

          • Provided escape occurs without negligence.

Reform?

• Australian High Court: Subsume the rule into normal laws of negligence

  • For

    • Far easier to apply

    • Get over difficulties of “non natural use of land”

  • Against

    • Lord Goff in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [1994]:

      • We’d have a more coherent body of common law principle

        • If Rylands v Fletcher was just held to be a limited extension of the law of nuisance

          • For cases where there is an isolated escapes from land.

    • Lord Scott in Transco Plc v Stockport MBC [2003]:

      • Would stretch negligence law to breaking point to extend principle of non-delegable duty

    • Lord Bingham:

      • 4 problems with this:

        • Small category of case where just to hold D liable even without fault (as long as damage is foreseeable)

        • The principle has stayed separate for over a century

        • Existing rule was not overruled previously, but merely controlled by Cambridge Water – and was a good control.

        • Would move away from French and German Law which gives similar system of no-fault protection.

      • Equally, why not just clarify the law of “non-natural user” rather than wipe it away entirely?

• US: Make Rylands v Fletcher rule of strict liability for ultra hazardous activities

  • For

    • Lord Hoffmann in Transco

      • Rule is not particularly strict because it excludes liability when the escape is for the most common reasons,

        • namely vandalism

        • or unusual natural events.

        • And when there is a “natural” use of the land

      • Also, liability often excluded by statutory immunities

      • Essentially, decades of legal though has only...