Doctrine of Consideration
- Valid contract: agreement, ILCR/capacity, consideration.
- Definitions: consideration.
Currie v Misa, [Lush J]: ‘right, interest, profit, benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other’.
Dunlop v Selfridge, [Dunedin LJ]: ‘act of forbearance of one party, or promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.’
- PAST CONSIDERATION.
general rule: not good consideration (Eastwood v Kenyon: raising girl; Roscorla v Thomas: buying horse).
exception: Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, [Ld Scarman]:
1. act performed at promisor’s request (Lampleigh v Braithwait: c. intervened with king at d’s request).
2. payment understood to be due (may be implied).
commercial: more likely (Re Casey’s Patents: manager’s past service).
domestic: less likely (Re McArdle: wife did repairs on h’s bungalow, then promised pay no).
3. contract would have been legally enforceable apart from this issue (i.e. agreement, ICLR, capacity; existing contractual obligation; existing public duty obligation?).
- Consideration must move from promisee: both parties must give (Tweddle v Atkinson: fathers of bride + groom agree to give money to groom groom cannot enforce father-in-law’s promise).
but: s1 The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999: 3rd party can enforce contract explicitly for his benefit (unless excluded).
- Consideration must be sufficient, not adequate.
need not be adequate (Chappell v Nestle: chocolate wrappers part of consideration).
must be sufficient: ‘value in eyes of the law’.
White v Bluett: promise not to complain NOT good consideration (no legal right to complain).
Hamer v Sidaway [US]: promise to refrain from vices good consideration (curtailing rights).
Arrale v Costain Civil Engineering: promise not to do thing did not intend to NOT good consideration.
- Existing public duty obligation: not good consideration (Collins v Godefroy).
legal duty (Collins v Godefroy: attending court when subpoenaed).
parents (Ward v Byham: maintenance of child + keeping child happy OK: beyond legal duty).
police: duty limited.
England v Davidson: duty does not extend to providing info. to individuals can claim reward;
Harris v Sheffield United FC: police presence on ground OK: assisting club in duty to maintain order.
- Existing obligation to 3rd party: valid consideration (Scotson v Pegg: delivery of coal to party already bound to receive).
rationale: promisor gains legal certainty – right to sue promisee directly for breach.
confirmed: The Eurymedon.
extended: promise to perform pre-existing contractual duty to 3rd party valid (Pao On v Lau Yiu Long).
Promise to Pay More (i.e. consideration: performance of existing obligation)
- General rule: existing contractual obligation NOT good consideration (Stilk v Myrick: seamen contracted to finish voyage).
approved: The Atlantic Baron.
- Exception 1: extra obligation (Hartley v Ponsonby: finish voyage with undermanned ship – dangerous).
- Exception 2: promisor receives ‘factual consideration’/’practical benefit’ (Williams v Roffey Bros, [Glidewell LJ):
test – [Glidewell LJ]:
1. A has contract with B to supply goods + services.
2. B has reason to doubt A will not complete on time (i.e. late, bankrupt, unable to finish).
3. B promises to pay A extra to complete on time.
4. B obtains ‘practical/factual benefit’ or obviates disbenefit.
5. no duress.
BUT V. LIMITED: HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED.
not when promisee approaches promisor – ev. of duress (Adam Opel v Mitras Automotive).
does not apply to part payment of debt (Re Selectmove).
- Consider ECONOMIC DURESS (DSND Subsea v Petroleum Geo Ltd, [Dyson J]; confirmed in Carillion Construction v Felix).
definition: coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent (The Siboen & The SIbotre).
effect: contract voidable court can set aside (Pao On v Lau Yiu Long).
requires: PRESSURE –
a. resulting in lack of practical choice (e.g. time pressure).
definition: no ‘realistic practical alternative but to submit’ (DSND Subsea v Petroleum, [Dyson J]).
B & S Contracts v Victor Green: c. (stand co.) asked d. for more money days before exhibition.
Atlas Express v Kafco: threat not to deliver baskets to Woolworths just before Christmas.
b. which is illegitimate: factors – [Dyson J]:
i. actual/threatened breach of contract? (Atlas Express v Kafco).
ii. good/bad faith? (dep. on facts: legitimate threat? legitimate purpose?)
Atlas Express v Kafco: demand to get money not entitled to bad faith.
The Universe Sentinel: not let ship leave till contributed to union welfare fund bad faith.
DSND Subsea v Petroleum: c. refused to work until insurance in place good faith.
CTN v Gallagher: genuine mistake over who responsible for insurance good faith.
iii. v. protested at time? (DSND Subsea v Petroleum: no allegation of duress at time; parties on good terms).
iv. v. affirmed? ([Dyson J]: ‘if v. fails to take action to set aside within reasonable time after freed from undue influence’ – b/c contract only voidable, not void).
failure to take action variation contract affirmed.
The Atlantic Baron: c. waited 8 months to claim too long: contract affirmed.
DSND Subsea v Petroleum: P. relied on terms of variation contract affirmed.
immediate action to avoid duress affirmed
Atlas Express v Kafco: K paid only original contract price when invoiced.
B & S Contracts v Victor Green: VG deducted sum from bill no affirmation.
c. which is a significant cause inducing c. to enter into contract.
‘but for’ test (Huyton SA v Peter Cremer, [Mance J]: decisive or clinching).
(cf. duress of the person: need only be 1 reason – Barton v Armstrong).
commercial pressure: NOT duress.
hard bargain (Alec Lobb v Total Oil: harsh lease-back of garage just hard bargain, not duress)/
overwhelming pressure (R v AG England + Wales: SAS member had to sign Official Secrets Act or be demoted overwhelming pressure, but not illegitimate – justified purpose).
Promise to Accept Less (i.e. consideration: part payment of debt)
- General rule: part payment of debt NOT good consideration (Foakes v Beer: judgment debt interest).
factual benefit irrelevant (Re Selectmove: Williams v Roffey does NOT apply to debt – Inland Revenue need not accept payment in instalments to prevent bankruptcy)
- CL Exception 1: ‘new element’ with creditor’s agreement (Pinnel’s Case).
1. different thing
Pinnel’s Case: ‘hawk, a horse or robe’ to clear money debt, but not less money.
not promissory note for money (D & C Builders v Rees: cheque in no way better than money).
2. different place (Van Bergen v St Edmund Properties).
3. earlier time (Pinnel’s Case).
- CL Exception 2: payment of lesser sum by 3rd party (Welby v Drake).
rationale 1: fraud on 3rd party to renege.
rationale 2: new contract – creditor agrees 3rd party’s conditions in return for payment.
The Contract (Rights of 3rd Parties) Act 1999 may apply: debtor takes benefit of term not to sue him.
- Equitable exception: promissory estoppel (Central London Property Trust v High Trees House, [Ld Denning]).
definition: man ‘will not be allowed to go back on [promise] when it would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so’ (CLPT v High Trees House, [Ld Denning]).
elements:
1. shield not a sword: defence only, NOT cause of action (Combe v Combe).
2. clear + unequivocal promise (Woodhouse Cocoa v Nigerian Produce).
can be implied (Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co: talks to buy suspend obligation to repair).
3. promisee alters position in reliance (E.A. Ajayi v R.T Briscoe Ltd).
promise need not be only reason for alteration: promisor must disprove reliance if action taken after promise (Brikom Investments v Carr, [Ld Denning]).
part payment of debt: reliance by paying? BUT DUBIOUS (Collier v P & MJ Wright, [Arden LJ]).
4. reliance need not be detrimental (Alan & Co v El Nasr Export & Import: relied on better exchange rate, so no detriment [Ld Denning]: only reliance needed).
5. inequitable to resile promise (The Post Chaser): i.e. have circs giving rise to estoppel ceased?
detriment: not needed, but ev. of inequality (The Post Chaser).
equitable doctrine: discretionary – clean hands etc. (D & C Builders v Rees: taking advantage of builders’ poor finances).
effect: suspends legal rights, does not extinguish (Alan v El Nasr, [Ld Denning]) – can be resumed:
1. reasonable notice: must give promisee opportunity to resume position (Ajayi v Briscoe).
can be implied (Tool Metal Manufacturing v Tungsten Electric: earlier court case...