Criminal Damage revision notes--mock

Basic crim damage –s1(1)

AR:

damage/destroy:
- Matter of ‘fact and degree’ (Samuels v Stubbs).
- Can be temporary damage (Morphitas v Salmon; Fiak).
- Expense/effort to restore?
  - A (A juvenile) v R, no expense re spitting on policeman’s coat, could just be wiped clean.
  - Hardman v Chief Const Avon & Somerset: silhouettes painted on pavement using soluble paint; expense by council to clear up, doesn’t matter wasn’t permanent.
  - Roe v Kingerlee: smeared mud on walls of police cell; cost to remove = damage.
- Impairment of value or usefulness? (Morphitas v Salmon scratching on scaffolding, no impairment of value/usefulness).
  - Also Fiak stuffed blanket down lavatory in cell; flushed until floor flooded; cell & Blanket rendered temporarily useless.
Property—s10(1)
- Tangible nature, real or personal, including money and (a) wild creatures tamed; (b) not including wild mushrooms/flowers etc. [[say, eg: ‘this is tangible, personal property’]]
- ‘Tangible’ property, not information (R v Whitely).
Belonging to another-s10(2)
- Can belong to more than one person, to oneself and another (eg if breaking a vase that belongs to you but also your wife).
- Note, s10(2) includes someone with a proprietary right/interest-.
- And someone with a ‘charge’ (s10(2)(c), eg a mortgagee. So could damage ‘own’ house if is mortgaged.
- [[insurance company has an interest in the property, but not a proprietary one—Lucena v Craufurd]].
- (includes own property for s1(2), aggravated criminal damage).
Unlawfully

MR:

Intention/reckless as to destroying/damaging property belonging to another.
- Intention—ordinary meaning (R v Maloney)—aim/purpose.
- [[no oblique intent]].
- Reckless—R v G: reckless to (i) circumstances/result wen aware of the risk AND (ii) in circumstances, unreasonable to take that risk (social utility). –if no social utility—then not reasonable risk, even if very small risk (Chief Const Somerset & Avon v Shimmen).
(1) (R v Smith)—D knows, or is reckless, to the property belonging to another (MR extends to whole of AR).
- [[an ‘honest though mistaken belief’ that the property is his own no MR, Smith (James LJ)]]
- R v Smith: Tenant stripped wiring and floorboards etc; honestly believed was his own property; ignorance of civil law (land law) is can excuse. Not liable if honestly believed property belonged to himself.
(2) Intention/reckless as to destroy/damage the property
- For reckless, need to show also that the risk is unreasonable to take.
- [[if you have strong evidence of direct intent, you don’t need to consider recklessness]].

Aggravated crim dam –s1(2)

Destroy/damage [same as basic crim damage]
Property [same as basic crim damage]—tangible property—s10(1); R v Whitely
Belonging to D or another (can apply to own property), different to s1(1).
Without lawful excuse (special defences in s5 don’t apply).
[[NOTE, no need for life to be actually endangered, not part of AR (R v Sangha)—could note this here or in MR]].

Intention or reckless as to destroying/damage property.
- Intention (Maloney); reckless (R v G).
AND Intention/reckless as to endangering the life of another by the damage/destruction:
- Intention (Maloney); or reckless (R v G).
- R v Sangha (firebomb through letter box; flat was empty): doesn’t matter whether life was actually endangered [this bit is only MR, not AR]. [[conduct crime, not result]].
- Also Dudley (firebomb at house; family put out the fire)—no need for life to actually be endangered.
- R v Steer (fired shots at G, danger to life arose from the cause of the damage, the firing of gun, rather than the damage to property): The danger must come from the damage caused, not directly from the cause of the damage (Steer; Dudley; Webster).
- Webster: Pushed stone from bridge onto train below. D only intended to endanger life by the stone itself crashing through roof of train; but court found that D was also reckless as to whether the collapsing roof itself of train endangered life of passengers (though this was before R v G test). A ‘dismal distinction’.
- Where damage caused by fire---risk to life always arises from damage to the property (R v Steer—the burning property produces the flames and smoke, ‘ensuing conflagration’).

Defences

General defences apply (duress, self-defence, prevention of crime etc)—not the lawful excuses in s5

Arson—s(3) + s1(1)

destroys or damages
property
belonging to another
‘by fire’: ordinary meaning.
Without lawful excuse.

MR—intends/reckless to damage/destruction property belonging to another by fire.

Defences: can use s5 lawful excuses.

Aggravated arson—s(3) + s1(2)

destroys/damages
property
belonging to himself OR another
by fire.
Without lawful excuse

MR:

Intention/reckless as to destroying/damaging property by fire.
Intention/reckless as to endangering life by fire.

Defences: cannot use S5 lawful excuses

S2—Making threats to destroy or damage property (s2(a)—aggravated)

Makes a threat to another person to:
- (a)
  - destroy/damage
  - property
  - belonging to that other or a third person;
- or (b)
  - destroy/damage
  - his own property
  - in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of that other or third person.
- [[NOTE: if D makes a threat to destroy another’s property in a way he knows will endanger life, this has to be charged under s2(a) not (b)]].
Without lawful excuse

Intention that that other would fear it would be carried out.

Defences: s5 ‘without lawful excuse’ applies, unless committed in a way that endangers life.

S3—Possessing anything with intention to destroy/damage property – s3 (s3(b)—aggravated)

Has anything in his custody or control.

Intending, without lawful excuse, to use it or cause or permit another to use it
- (a) to destroy/damage any property belong to some other person;
- (b) to destroy/damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person.

Defences

‘without lawful excuse’, s5 (not for s1(2) aggravated crim dam)

s5 defences apply to: basic crim damage, and ss 2 & 3 CDA unless committed in a way that endangers life.
Intoxicated mistaken belief counts, even though basic intent crime (Jaggard v Dickinson: Because drunk, went to wrong house (thought friend’s house); broke window, damaged curtains—successfully used s5(2)(a) even though drunk.
s5(2)(a)—belief that owner consented or would have consented:
Actually 2 beliefs:
- (1) who D believes owns the property/is entitled to consent?
- (2) D believes that this person has consented, or would have consented.
S5(3)—purely subjective, can be mistaken belief. Can be intoxicated belief (Jaggard v Dickinson).
Even if fraudulent belief, D’s motive is irrelevant R v Denton: set fire to cotton mill with consent of owner; insurance fraud, defence still worked. Though was he also charged with s1(2), aggravated, to which s5(2) defences do not apply).
God cannot consent to damage (Blake v DPP: damaged concrete pillar near Parliament).
S5(2)(b)—belief the damage was necessary to protect other property
(1) D acts to protect property
- must be property, not to protect another person (R v Baker and Wilkins).
(2) D believes the property is in immediate need of protection (s5(2)(b)(i))
- Johnson v DPP: a squatter; damaged a door whilst fixing locks in it; claimed protecting property from burglars not belief in immediate need.
- Subjective test—s5(3).
- Re wheel clamps: Note: Mitchell (2004) and Lloyd v DPP (2002): car owners damaged wheel camps to free their cars; held—cars were not in immediate need of protection.
(3) D believes the means adopted are reasonable in all the circumstances.
- What D believes--Subjective test—s5(3).
(4) R v Hunt 4th objective element (Hunt; Hill)—objectively capable of protecting the property.
- R v Hunt: setting fire to some bedding (to show inadequacy of fire alarm) not objectively capable of protecting the property.
- Hill & Hall (hacksaw blade, intending to cut wire, outside nuclear submarine base, not objectively capable of protecting the property.
- Blake v DPP: writing on a pillar not objectively capable of protecting property in the Gulf States.

Issue of Voluntary intoxication

Majewski—voluntary intox is a defence for a specific intent crime, not basic intention.
So can use voluntary intoxication as defence for specific intent crimes: s2 and s3 Crim Damage Act:
- can use to show didn’t form the MR (Pordage) not whether capable;
- but Kingston—drunken intent still intent.
But not for basic intent crimes: s1(1) and s1(2):
- in that case, you direct the jury to consider whether D would have...

#15537 - Criminal Damage - GDL Criminal Law

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