Assault and Battery
Penalty for Assault/Battery: 5,000/6 months in prison – both in S39 CJA 1988
Common law or statutory offences?
Criminal Justice Act 1988 s39 – but only sets the penalty – doesn’t explain AR or MR
DPP v Little: judges here think that they are statutory offences
But – still need to give common law explanations – so easier to think of it as a common law offence
Assault
Committed when the accused ‘intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence’
Actus Reus
An assault is committed when the accused ‘intentionally, or recklessly, causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence;’ Fagan v MPC: confirmed by Hl in R v Ireland, Burstow
There must be apprehension of personal violence
The D must do something to make the V apprehend (ie anticipate, believe) he will suffer immediate and unlawful personal violence- no need for D to have actually applied force
The defendant must cause the victim to believe he can and will carry out the threat of force
R v Lamb
Revolver had 2 bullets in it– believing that it was safe – the D pointed it at his friend and pulled the trigger – his friend was shot dead
No assault because the victim did not fear violence
if the victim is caused to apprehend such a threat, it is irrelevant that the defendant does not in fact have the means to carry out the threat
Logdon v DPP: D found to have committed assault against V by showing her a pistol in a drawer saying that it was loaded and claiming he would hold her hostage – only the D knew that the gun was a replica and unloaded – but his actions/words caused the victim to believe otherwise
What if the victim is unusually sensitive?
Doesn’t matter – thin skull rule
Can the threat to use force be of any nature/form?
Earlier dicta - R v Mead & Belt: ‘no words or singing could ever constitute an assault’ per Holroyd J
But opinion has changed - R v Wilson: the words ‘get out the knives’ would on their own be sufficient to constitute an assault’
R v Ireland/Burstow: Accused had made several silent phone calls
Lord Steyn said the proposition that words won’t suffice is ‘unrealistic and indefensible’ : held here that silence conveyed a message to the victim as was as such capable of forming the basis of assault – indirectly confirms that words spoken may amount to an assault
A thing said is a thing done – so words alone can amount to assault
Words spoken can also negate an assault: Tuberville v Savage
The threat of violence must be unlawful: occasionally it will be considered lawful (e.g. self-defence/consent)
The violence apprehended must be immediate and personal
Focus on what the V actually apprehended
Smith v Chief Superintendent Woking Police Station: Smith entered grounds of large house - stared through window of the bedsit where the victim lived – she thought he was going to attack her: D argued that threat wasn’t immediate as he could not have got through the window etc.
but court said it was assault – V cannot be expected to be rational in that situation
R v Constanza: stalker pursued victim for 18 months – followed her home from work on numerous occasions, made silent phone calls, sent and delivered 800 letters to her home; charge of assault arose from 2 particular letters sent in June 1995 – CA said that the key thing is that there must be a threat of violence not excluding in the immediate future – hand-delivered, so he must be close – violence could happen at any time
Ireland/Burstow
Ireland: heavy breathing down the phone - question of immediacy Lord Steyn – ‘fear may dominate her emotions … she may fear the possibility of immediate personal violence’ – victim not necessarily thinking logically so fears there could be immediate personal violence
Almost re-writes the test – rather than apprehension of immediate personal violence – could be immediate apprehension of personal violence
Change hasn’t actually happened - but seems courts will take liberal view
Mens Rea
Fagan – ‘an assault is any act which intentionally or possibly recklessly – causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence’
R v Venna: recklessness could be enough for the MR
R v Savage;Parmenter: confirmed the view that Cunningham recklessness must be established
Direct Intention: See Chapter 3 – Maloney: Lord Bridge – ordinary meaning – “desire/motive”
Cunningham recklessness: subjective: D must actually know of the existence of the risk and have deliberately taken it anyway
Battery
Fagan v MPC– ‘the actual … use of unlawful force to another person without his consent’
Actus Reus
Ireland/Burstow: Lord Steyn – ‘the unlawful application of force by the defendant upon the victim’
“Force”
Doesn’t need degree of violence
Can Collins v Wilcock: Goff LJ: fundamental principle is that any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery
Touching clothes can be enough – R v Thomas: involved sexual assault: ran his hand along the hem of a girl’s skirt – he said he never touched her
No hostility required: Faulkner v Talbot: D had consensual sex with 14 year old boy– still a battery even though no hostile intent
Don’t have to touch the person yourself - indirect application enough
Haystead v DPP: D pushed a woman who dropped a baby – D caused the baby to be dropped
DPP v K: stole sulphuric acid – poured it into hand dryer - went over another boy’s face – didn’t matter that he wasn’t in the room – he had caused it
The force must be unlawful: common claim is that the V consented to the application of force
Collins v Wilcock: Lord Goff - a certain amount of physical contact must inevitably be accepted
Failure to act: Fagan –act can be viewed as a continuing act
R v Santana Bermudez: said he did not have any needles or ‘sharps’ etc. in his pocket – but he did –charged with battery: court applied R v Roberts and R v Miller: held that he had created a danger (by exposing the officer to the risk)
Mens Rea
Intentional or reckless application of unlawful force upon another
R v Venna: intention or recklessness
As with assault – application of Cunningham recklessness
Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm: S47
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s 47: imprisonment for any term not exceeding 5 years
“Assault”
Can actually be assault or battery: DPP v Little and Ireland;Burstow
“Occasioning”: Cause (DPP v Santana-Bermudez)
“Actual Bodily Harm”
R v Miller: too broad – any interference with ‘health or comfort’
R v Chan Fook: better case
CA: injury must ‘not be so trivial as to be wholly insignificant’ - there must be actual harm so interference with health/comfort not enough
Harm can include psychological injury as long as it amounts to a recognised medical condition (analogy with nervous-shock) not ‘mere emotions such as fear or distress’
Confirmed in R v Ireland: Burstow
Examples of ABH:
DPP v T:momentary loss of consciousness held to be capable of amounting to actual bodily harm –injurious impairment of victim’s sensory functions
emphasised that in order to be excluded needs to be transient and trifling – not transient or trifling
DPP v Smith: (2006) Smith cut off estranged girlfriend’s ponytail - court held that despite not leaving mark on the body or breaking the skin there was still assault as ‘dead tissue’ was still part of the body
Mens Rea: s47
Mens rea required for the assault or battery
But – no mens rea required for the harm itself:
R v Savage/Parmenter
Offence of mens rea – need it for the first part but not the second
Malicious Wounding Or Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm: S20
Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861:
‘whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously would or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument shall be guilty of an offence…’
Note: s20 creates two separate offences, one of malicious wounding, the second of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm
Actus Reus
“Wound”
‘the continuity of the whole skin must be broken’ – both layers of skin – need for external bleeding
C (a minor) v Eisenhower: no wound because no external bleeding
“Infliction of grievous bodily harm”
Infliction: Now bears the same meaning of ‘cause’ so usual causation rules apply
Difficult to determine in the past, but following R v Wilson it was decided that it is possible that there could be an infliction of GBH contrary to s20 without an assault being committed
R v Ireland/Burstow: nuisance phone calls - GBH for psychiatric injury – confirming that an assault did not need to be committed
R v Dica: open to a jury to convict a D under s20 for recklessly infecting another person with a sexually transmitted disease
R v Konzani: unprotected consensual sex with 3 women without disclosing his HIV status
Grievous bodily harm
“really serious harm” – DPP v Smith but no need for the ‘really’ so “serious harm” R v Saunders
“psychological harm” – Ireland;Burstow – cause and effect will need to be proved by expert evidence
R v Bollum – CA held that jury should consider the effect of injuries on the victim – take into account age and health – look at totality of the injuries: here a baby with endless cuts and bruieses which on their own would not have been enough but taken together amounted to serious harm
Prosecution Charging Standards: typical injuries amounting to GBH include those resulting from loss of sensory function, more than minor permanent...