#15538 - Robbery Blackmail Burglary - GDL Criminal Law

Criminal Law : Robbery, Blackmail & Burglary

Robbery, s8 TA 1968

• S8 TA: steals + immediately before/at time of, and in order to do so, uses force on any person/or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being there & then subjected to force.

AR—theft + force or threats of force on any person immediately before or at time of stealing

(1) Full AR for theft.

• Appropriation

• Property

• Belong to another

• R v Robinson: need all elements of theft, AR and MR. [[in this case, had s2(1)(a) defence, so no theft, so no robbery]].

• Corcoran v Anderton: only need s3(1) any appropriation, Morris any one right of owner—so touching handbag sufficient for appropriation (doesn’t matter they ran off empty handed).

• R v Mitchell

(2) Use of force or threats of force

• [[old law—required use of violence]].

• 3 ways to satisfy::

  • (a) uses force:

  • Does not require violence; matter of fact for jury.

  • R v Dawson & James: ‘force’ not defined, q of fact for jury.

  • R v Dawson & James: violence not required, does not have to be ‘substantial’ force, can include nudging victim.

  • R v Hale: hand over someone’s mouth = force.

  • Force can be applied through property: R v Clouden: wrenched shopping bag out of grasp—force to detach property can be force on the person.

  • P & Others v DPP: no force, re removing cigarette from victim’s hand. Must be more than minimal contact.

  • OR (b) puts a person in fear of being there and then subjected to force [result option]:

  • A threat is enough.

  • Fear meaning apprehend (anticipates/expects) force, not fear (R v DPP).

  • Maybe apprehension not needed (R v DPP doubted whether needed, Grant v CPS said needed).

  • OR (c) seeks to put someone in fear of being there and then subject to force [doesn’t need a result, conduct-based, no one need actually be put in fear, eg if they are deaf].

  • R v Taylor: re bank cashier, note demanded cashier hand over money otherwise D would hurt a customer; customer wasn’t put in fear, unaware of threat; glass partition between customers and cashier. Quashed conviction—person must be put in fear for their own safety, not safety of others. Neither customer nor cashier feared being there and then subjected to force.

  • So D must intend V to be aware of threat to self (not threat to unaware 3^rd party).

• NB: where you have a threat of future force, will not be robbery (not ‘there and then’ in fear of being subject to force)—but could be a blackmail.

(3) On any person

• Need not be the victim of theft [[but target of threat must be aware, Taylor]].

(4) immediately before or at the time of stealing

• Issue (1)—where theft occurred before force was used—R v Hale, (Everleigh LJ): appropriation is continuing act, for jury to decide when it ends. Re in house of Mrs C; took her jewellery; then gagged her and tied her up; D argued theft was already complete when force was used; so force not used ‘in order to steal’ or ‘immediately before/at time of’. HELD: (1) hand over mouth = force; (2) alternatively, later force counted as theft was continuing act.

• CA also said it is ‘reasonable’, perhaps likely, for jury to decide that Ds still appropriating the property, whilst they are still on the premises.

• Issue (2), where threat significantly before actual theft:

• R v Donaghy & Marshall: jury must be satisfied that, at time of theft, threat was still operating on mind of the victim; and D is aware of that. Re threatened taxi driver, when arrived stole from him, did not repeat earlier threat—not guilty.

MR—theft + intention to use force to steal

(1) MR for theft

• Dishonestly

• ITPD

• R v Robinson: need all elements of theft (including MR). In that case, no robbery because had s2(1)(a) defence, believed the money was legally his as he was owed debt.

(2) Intention to use force in order to steal

• So accidental force not enough for robbery.

• R v Hale continuing act theory might be useful—where D has started stealing before force is used.

• [[NOTE: if steals, and uses force, but not in order to steal, could only be charged with theft (and maybe battery as well, subject to implied consent if in busy place etc).

NB, rather than structuring by AR & MR, could structure as four elements:

1. Steals (full AR and MR for theft)

2. (i) Uses force on any person or (ii) puts any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force or (iii) seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force.

3. Immediately before or at time of doing so (stealing)

4. In order to do so (steal)

Blackmail, s21 AT 1968

• S21 TA: ‘with a view to gain for himself or another or with intention to cause loss to another, he makes an unwarranted demand with menaces’

AR—Demand + Menaces

(1) Making a Demand

• To be given ordinary meaning.

• No need for demand to be effective in securing compliance.

• Can be express, OR:

• Can be implied, from conduct/circumstances--R v Collister & Warhurst (re implied demand, police officers to victim ‘what have you got for us?’)

• [[look out for an implied demand, orally/by conduct or other means, might exist alongside a written demand]].

• Treacy v DPP: where demand is made by post, written demand is made moment it is posted.

(2) With menaces

• R v Lawrence & Pomeroy: ‘menace’ = an ordinary English word, common sense, matter for jury doesn’t normally need elaboration, can be express or implied.

• Wider than a threat/violence: Thorne v Motor Trade Association (MTA): menace = a threat of ‘any action detrimental to or unpleasant’ to the person addressed---not limited to threats of violence.

• But menaces suggests high degree of coercion: Harry: no menace if threat would not intimidate or influence anyone.

• R v Clear: an objective test whether amounts to menaces, menace = a threat of such a nature & extent that ‘the mind of an ‘ordinary person of normal stability and courage’ might be influenced or made apprehensive so as to accede unwillingly’ to the demand.’

  • [[if the victim is of particularly strong courage/stability, D still guilty if an ‘ordinary person’ would have acceded unwillingly]].

• But can consider factors about the particular victim if D was aware of them (R v Clear; R v Garwood):

• If D targeting particular vulnerability, and knows of it (Garwood).

• SO you can have a menace if:

  • (1) even though failed to influence actual victim, if the threats might affect mind of an ordinary person of normal stability (Clear).

  • (2) where threat would not affect mind of ordinary person of normal stability; but did affect the mind of this actual victim, and D was aware it would so affect the actual victim (Clear; Garwood).

• R v Lambert: it’s about the making of the threat; Irrelevant whether threat can actually be carried out; nor that the one making the demand is to be the one carrying out the menaces.

MR—unwarranted demand + intention to make gain/cause loss

(1) Demand with menaces is ‘unwarranted'

• To be ‘not unwarranted: S21(1)(a) & (b): unwarranted unless:

  • (a) reasonable grounds for making demand;

  • AND (b) use of menaces are a proper means of enforcing the demand.

• Burden of proof on prosecution—but need only show that either demand or menace is unwarranted. So if (a) isn’t satisfied (doesn’t believe reasonable grounds for making demand), then no need to consider (b)

• R v Lambert: Entirely subjective approach whether demand is warranted, exclusively a question of D’s belief. So if genuinely believes s21(1)(a) and (b)—then not unwarranted.

• Re the demand, whether ‘reasonable’—entirely subjective.

• But ‘proper’ re use of menaces—some objectivity, an objective check (R v Harvey)—re whether D believes is ‘proper’ means, suggests how D believes others would regard his behaviour, bit like Ghosh test.

• Criminal Law Revision Committee: proper = socially & morally acceptable.

• Where menace involves a crime (and D knows it is criminal) never warranted, not ‘proper’ (Harvey; Ulyett & Plummer). Where D threatens criminal action + knows it amounts to crime, not a ‘proper’ demand (Harvey).

• So note if the threat is not unlawful (Harvey)—could then possibly be warranted, if believes is ‘proper’ menace; and believe in ‘reasonable’ to make demand.

(2) Demand made with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause a loss to another

• ‘Gain or loss’, s34(2)(a): gain/loss in money or other property. Gain includes keeping what one already has; loss includes not getting what one would otherwise get.

• [[eg, if someone wants kudos, or the title, or prestige, or sexual nature—won’t qualify]].

• Generally, property of some kind can be found to exist (R v Bevans: forced Dr at gunpoint to inject morphine; injection of morphine counted as ‘property’ gained for himself, D had argued it was for relief of pain not to make a gain)).

Burglary, s9 TA + aggravated s10 TA

• S9(1)(a) CF (b):

  • (a): D must enter as a trespasser; and, at that time, have intention re ulterior offence (to steal/inflict GBH/unlawfully damage property) burglary committed at point of entry, doesn’t matter whether D goes on to commit the ulterior offence, it’s about whether he intended to commit the ulterior offence at point of entry.

  • (b): D must have entered as a trespasser, and, once inside, actually steal/attempt to steal/inflict GBH/attempt to inflict GBH burglary committed at the point of commission or attempted commission of the theft/infliction of GBH.

  • Reason for having both (a) and (b):

  • Entering as a trespasser, but without relevant ulterior intent -> guilty of s9(1)(b).

  • Entering as trespasser, with ulterior intent, but unable to carry it out guilty of s9(1)(a).

S9(1)(a) (offence is complete upon entry)

AR:

• enters;

• a building or...